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The preservation of property . . . is a primary object of the social compact ....
Where is the inviolability of property, if the legislature . . .can take land from
one citizen . . . and vest it in another? .... It is infinitely wiser and safer to
risk some possible mischiefs, than to vest in the legislature so . . .dangerous and
enormous a power ....
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310-12 (1795).
The fundamental maxims of a free government . . . require that the right[]
of ... property ... be held sacred.
Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829) (Story, J., for the
Court).
[R]ememberGl always that generosity is not a virtue when dealing with the
property of others.
Cashion v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 123 N.C. 267, 273 (1898).
A close and literal construction deprives [constitutional guarantees] of half
their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted
more in sound than in substance.
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
[T]he most enlightened judicial policy is to let people manage their own busi-
ness in their own way ....
Dr. Niles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
For too long a time, it has been fashionable, if not a mark of
insight and achievement, among much of academia and the intel-
ligentsia to denigrate entrepreneurs, businessmen, and private eco-
nomic liberties. But as the American philosopher H. L. Menchen
wryly observed: "When I hear artists and authors making fun of
businessmen I think of a regiment in which the band makes fun of
the cooks."' Those who endorse the quasi-religious pleas from the
Enlightened Left to feed more and more of the nation's resources
to the modern Omnivorous State for purportedly noble ends, ignore
Justice Holmes' warning that: "Experience should teach us to be
most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's pur-
poses are beneficent.
' 2
1. H. MENCHEN, A NEW DIcTIoNARY OF QUOTATIONS 134 (1987 ed.).
2. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Holmes, I., dissenting). See also
Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in Federal and State Consti-
tutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty and Property," 4 Hxv. L. Rzv. 365 (1891).
[Vol. 92
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In light of the importance of economic liberties to any democratic
system, one would expect the judiciary to be a jealous guardian of
all our constitutional freedoms, including economic liberty. Instead,
the courts have decreed that much of the Constitution and the orig-
inal understanding of the nature of economic liberty is now a dead
letter. Economic liberty may be regulated nearly to the point of
extinction so long as government's basis is not patently foolish or
irrational. With no textual support in the Constitution, courts have
relegated economic liberty to second- or third-class status, holding
that it is not sufficiently worthy to be included among the pantheon
of fundamental or "preferred" freedoms.
Far more often than not, the average citizen or ordinary worker,
consumer, owner, and taxpayer [hereinafter the "little guy"] bears
the brunt of the "beneficent government" referred to by Justice
Holmes that all too often is a "misguided missle." As a result, the
"little guy" likely feels that with friends like that, who need ene-
mies? While the judiciary did serve for many years as a bulwark
against infringement of economic liberties, more recently it has nearly
eviscerated those freedoms. For example, onerous and seemingly
crushingly unfair government regulation of very small business (per-
haps motivated by big business' wish to eliminate competitors) has
been routinely upheld on the least scintilla of "reasonableness."
Making matters worse, the courts have not required Congress or
state legislatures to place express time limits or sunset clauses on
economic experiments so that meaningful judicial review could even-
tually be had. Instead, these experiments have been allowed to con-
tinue in perpetuity without facing an ultimate day-of-reckoning.
Without meaningful judicial review as to the merits of local eco-
nomic experiments which often directly or indirectly harm the "little
guy" worker, consumer, or property-owner, the other branches of
government are subject to the constant influence of special-interests
unless or until the situation finally produces a long train of abuses
which arouses protracted focused dissent among the general citi-
zenry.
In eminent domain, the judiciary has adopted a similar supine
posture. Courts now define public use so all-encompassingly that
property may be taken from one private individual and given to
1989]
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another. Nor is severe economic loss in the form of inverse con-
demnation from regulatory restriction held to be worthy of just com-
pensation even though an owner may have lost over ninety percent
of the value of his or her property. Additionally, the property owner's
journey from a taking or regulatory loss to just compensation may
well be described as a legal-minefield. 3
The present situation contrasts starkly with the framers' strongly
held view of the importance of economic liberty and the readiness
with which just compensation should be forthcoming for any taking
or regulatory overreaching. The current woeful legal status of ec-
onomic liberties contrasts sharply with the preferential treatment given
personal freedoms, which are deemed to be a branch of constitu-
tional guarantees somehow more noble and worthy than mundane
economic liberties. While government can reduce the value of private
property to all but a tiny fraction of its preexisting value with im-
punity, it must show a compelling interest to infringe on a personal
freedom in any way. Constitutional history and the need to adhere
to a written constitution aside, the Supreme Court aptly noted that:
"Life, liberty, property, and the equal protection of the law, grouped
together in the Constitution, are so related that the deprivation of
any ... may lessen or extinguish the value of the other three." 4
Yet this common-sense approach has been sorely lacking in judicial
decisions on economic liberties over the last 55 years.
3. The Federal Circuit, in Yuba Goldfields, Inc. v. United States, said:
[T]he law of just compensation is hardly a model of clarity .... [It is] 'largely characterized
by confusing and incompatible results, often explained in conclusionary terminology, circular
reasoning, and empty rhetoric.' [It is] 'liberally salted with paradox' and ... 'jarring out-
comes' that are 'surprising to the uninitiated.'
723 F.2d 884, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citations omitted) (quoting Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging
by Police Powers: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S.C.L. Ray. 1, 2 (1970); Mich-
elman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. Rv. 1165, 1169-70 (1967)).
4. Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636 (1914). For a good example of the Supreme Court's
view of personal freedoms, see United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973) (an "identifiable trifle" is enough to confer standing to
litigate "a matter of principle"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (reversing conviction
for wearing large profane statement on personal clothing while in courthouse); Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (a de minimis infringement on a basic right is enough
to trigger "compelling government interest" standard of review). But, of course, the entire process
by which some liberties are deemed more "fundamental" than others is highly suspect. See Ely,
Forword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HAgv. L. Rav. 5 (1978).
[Vol. 92
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There is clearly a need to reexamine anew the status of economic
liberties under the Constitution and to restore them to their rightful
place. As Justice Holmes noted in this regard: "It is one of the
misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in [verbiage] and
therefore for a long time cease to provoke further analysis. ' Thus,
recent precedent should not prevent this reexamination because case-
law may not preempt the Constitution itself. This is especially true
when individual rights would be strengthened, rather than reduced,
by a reversal or correction of well-meaning but erroneous judicial
pronouncements.
Honoring the framers' intent is not "conservative judicial ac-
tivism" but is instead a return to the meaning of our written Con-
stitution. If its meaning has been irrevocably lost, a constitutional
convention should be held to restore an ascertainable meaning to
the Constitution-or openly admit that judges are now freed from
the vestiges of judicial restraint in adjudicating constitutional law
and can now openly impose their own personal or class predilections
in the guise of discerning the entrails of current mores. Leaving to
judges, rather than to elected legislators, the authority to discern
public mores is farcical and would abrogate any meaningful concept
of constitutional law as a system of ordered liberty. It is, after all,
a written Constitution that we are interpreting, not a delphic-riddle
requiring a judicial priesthood to render it intelligible. It should not
be forgotten by the legal profession that is perhaps too often caught
up in the intricacies of a now highly-developed, judicially-crafted
constitutional jurisprudence, that the Constitution was written for,
by, and to the people.
6
5. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Felix
Frankfurter observed "a tendency . . . whereby phrases are made to do service for critical analysis
by being turned into dogma." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 352 (1946). See also Illinois ex
rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting) ("A rule of
law should not be drawn from a figure of speech."); Allegheny College v. National Chataqua Co.
Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 373, 159 N.E. 173, 174 (1927) (Cardozo, C.J,, for the court) ("The half truths
of one generation tend ... to perpetuate themselves in the law as the whole truths of another, when
constant repetition brings it about that qualifications, once taken for granted, are disregarded or
forgotten."). Verbiage should never be allowed to hinder determination of its underlying legislative
intent. "One of the inadequacies of language is that sooner or later, the thing is confused with the
symbol for that thing." Gaines v. Bader, 253 S.W.2d 1014, 1015 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
6. President Woodrow Wilson noted that the "Constitution of the United States is not a mere
lawyers' document ... ." W. WiLsoN, CoNsnTuTIONAL GOVENMENT IN THE UNITED STATEs 69 (1908).
1989]
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The alternative to interpreting the Constitution as originally writ-
ten and intended would be to reduce our legal system to one of
ideologically-warring factions of men and women (rather than of
law) who intermittently take control of the ship-of-state and judicial
appointment process and thus feel vindicated in imposing personal
(although strongly held) views to off-set the perceived errors and
excesses of a predecessor group. Constitutional adjudication would
thus become little more than ideological plunder for the latest po-
litical winners in a revised version of the "spoils" system. In the
absence of a transcendent body of principles undergirding consti-
tutional law, a cycle of judicial retaliation might then be perpetu-
ated, not unlike the seemingly constant cycle of Middle East
infighting.
Law is reason and thus ideas sooner or later manifest themselves
as law. Today western civilization seems to be trapped between two
opposing ideologies which affect life in general and economic lib-
erties in particular: collectivism and individual freedom. Although
these opposing ideologies have been debated since the time of Plato
and Aristotle, they are especially urgent today. Western civilization
has been living off of the accumulated moral capital of the last three
or four centuries which is dangerously close to depletion. As a result,
we may foist on ourselves a radical system from either end of the
ideological spectrum and be headed to a very dark future indeed.
The free market is the only real way in which individual moral
choice can be encouraged or even allowed in an open pluralistic
society that knows no orthodoxy or civil religion. Without a free
market, government will inevitably chill the exercise of personal free-
doms by increasingly controlling individuals' livelihoods. Histori-
cally, this has been the case whenever a monarchy, republic, or
politburo has reordered an economy's workings, necessitating greater
and greater control in an attempt to achieve an ever-elusive goal.
An open society thus dies from internal ideological pressure as a
radical despotic "civil religion" attempts to fill the void left by
abandoned older principles by claiming to give meaning to life and
is imposed on a nation no longer capable of democratic self-gov-
ernment.
The free market, especially when supported by constitutional
guarantees, restricts government's historic tendency to control more
[Vol. 92
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and more of life. The free market gives moral worth to individual
decisions by freeing us from government coercion. After all, one
cannot legislate morality, a truth frequently forgotten when dealing
with this branch of constitutional rights. Thus, one's actions have
no moral worth even in a just society (assuming we could perma-
nently escape humanity's limited capacity for perfection and create
a truly just society) when coerced by law.
The free market does not require humanity to first become better
than it is in order to further the greater good. Likewise, the free
market does not require establishment of an elite to manage our
lives until the rest of us are someday, somehow sufficiently enlight-
ened to do the job ourselves. Instead, a free market provides a self-
enforcing motive by which one who satisfies society's wants and
needs simultaneously improves his or her own lot.
However, current legal thought has abandoned reliance on those
principles. Instead, it has attempted to use a standardless or un-
principled ad hoc method, groping along on a case-by-case basis.
This often results in jarringly unfair and unexpected results. As the
Supreme Court admitted in 1978, eminent domain issues involve
"essentially ad hoc ... inquiries . . . . "7 The refusal to rely on
permanent principles in this or any other area of constitutional law
(even, or especially, in the name of modernity) is ominous. His-
torically, governments before and after the American Revolution
have refused to limit themselves to any such fixed standards. Thus,
those governments effectively usurped absolute power by retaining
the ability to continually redefine rights anew, using a case-by-case
method in which everything is always up-for-grabs and the potential
for corruption and influence-peddling is increased considerably.
This ad hoc method of adjudicating economic liberty issues has
been derided when applied to personal freedoms such as the right
to own and publish pornography. Justice Potter Stewart's now-fa-
mous formulation that while he could not define pornography, he
certainly knew it when he saw it, 8 has been blindly applied in re-
viewing economic liberty questions. Although Justice Stewart's for-
7. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
8. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
19891
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mulation has never been adopted by a majority of the Court in the
area of pornography because of its unworkability, subjectivity, and
standardlessness, under the prevailing case-by-case methodology, trial
judges and hearings examiners are presumed to "know" when the
state has gone too far in economic matters even though no mean-
ingful definition or standard exists by which to guide and inform
such decisions.
Thus, the real point of the American Revolution has been largely
forgotten. At the founding of our nation, we as individuals did not
simply receive a handful of permitted or enumerated rights from
the government in a moment of corporate kindness. Rather, we held
all rights and, instead, vested government with limited power, as
the ninth amendment attests. The rarity (and indeed fragility) of a
bona fide constitutional republic in the annals of an almost uni-
formly despotic human history should not be underestimated. Uto-
pian-like criticism of our constitutional government's failure to reach
its ideals, stated in absolute terms, must be tempered with the re-
alization of our nation's unique status as an unparalleled effort at
institutionalizing wide-spread freedom: government by law rather
than men is a daring experiment barely two centuries old (and much
less than that in most nations where attempts at establishing or main-
taining constitutional republics are underway). No one knows yet
whether a truly republican form of government can be permanently
established or whether it will inevitably dissolve into despotism of
one type or another that has, until now, been the overwhelming,
prevailing norm throughout 6,000 years of recorded human history.9
9. Ayn Rand captured the essence of this concept when she noted that:
Every political system is based on some code of ethics. The dominant ethics of mankind's
history were variants of the altruist-collectivist doctrine which subordinated the individual
to some higher authority, either mystical or social. Consequently, most political systems
were [and are] variants of the same statist tyranny .. . [with] [slociety . . . placed outside
the moral law, as its .,. source or exclusive interpreter ....
The most profoundly revolutionary achievement of the United States ... was the
subordination of society to moral law.
All previous [governments] regarded man as a sacrificial means to the ends of others,
and society as an end in itself. The United States regarded man as an end in himself, and
[Vol. 92
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In this light, the judiciary's tragically unwise virtual abandon-
ment of meaningful review of legislative or executive economic reg-
ulation has recently borne rather bitter fruit which adversely affects
the "little guy" much more often than big business. For example,
in 1976, the Supreme Court upheld a New Orleans ordinance that
outlawed all food push-cart vendors from selling food in the French
Quarter who had not been in business at least eight-years prior to
its effective date, forcing a woman who had been selling food there
for only two-years out of business and leaving just two vendors
remaining. 0 The Supreme Court's view of its role and the issues at
stake was surprisingly modest, given its treatment of personal free-
doms:
[T]he judiciary may not ... judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative ...
determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed
along suspect lines; in the . . . economic sphere, it is only the . . . wholly arbitrary-
act, which cannot [satisfy] . .. the Fourteenth Amendment."
In 1981, the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the use of eminent
domain to convert a "tightly knit residential enclave of first- and
second-generation Americans, for many of whom their home was
their single most valuable and cherished asset" to build a privately-
owned auto-assembly plant. 2 In 1982, the Supreme Court of Cal-
society as a means to the peaceful, orderly, voluntary coexistence of individuals.
A. RAND, CAPTALism: THE UNKN wN IDEAL 286-87 (1946) (emphasis in original).
More recently, columnist Jack Anderson noted that "all those other constitutions said, 'We the
government' grant you, the people, the following rights. Our constitution says, 'We the people' grant
the following powers to the government and the government can have no others except those we have
listed herein." Anderson, A Difference in Constitutions, The Wash. Post, Sept. 21, 1986, at C7, col.
4. (favorably quoting President Reagan's comparison of the United States' and Soviet Union's con-
stitutions).
10. City of New Orleans v, Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942) (upholding a law limiting the amount of wheat that owners of land could grow for their
own personal consumption on the basis that it would lessen commerce by reducing the amount of
food that land owners otherwise would have to buy from retailers).
11. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303-04 (citation omitted) (citing Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri,
342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963)).
12. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich, 616, 658, 304 N.W. 2d 455,
470 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting). Justice Ryan further stated:
The reverberating clang of [this decision's] economic, sociological, political and jurispru-
dential impact [on public use] is likely to be felt for generations. By its decision, the Court
has altered the law of eminent domain ... jeopardiz[ing] the security of all private property
ownership [by allowing government to take private property for use by a private corpo-
ration].
Id. at 645, 304 N.W.2d at 464-65.
19891
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ifornia upheld a city's use of eminent domain to acquire a profes-
sional football franchise. 13 In 1984, the Supreme Court upheld
Hawaii's use of eminent domain to transfer land from large owners
to individual single-family home buyers. 14 And in 1985, California
upheld an ordinance prohibiting an owner whose apartment building
was under rent-control from converting it to a non-residential use."
Commentators have criticized this trend,' 6 noting the consider-
able distance the judiciary has traveled from the intent of the framers
of the Bill of Rights that "private property [not] be taken for public
use without just compensation," as stated in the fifth amendment.
As a result, the public use limitation has been effectively declared
a nullity, much like the privileges and immunities clause. 7 Forgotten
is the truth that personal freedoms are only as secure as and flourish
only in proportion to economic liberties. Justice Antonin Scalia has
criticized the present judicial approach to economic liberties:
[C]ontrasting economic affairs with human affairs as though economics is a sci-
ence developed for the benefit of dogs or trees, something that has nothing to
13. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835 (1982). Chief Justice
Rose Bird, concurring, noted that she was "forced by the current state of the law to agree with the
result reached by the majority" but that it constituted "creeping statism." Id. at 76, 646 P.2d at
845 (Bird, C.J., concurring). See also Comment, Taking the Oakland Raiders: A Theoretical Re-
consideration of the Concepts of Public Use and Just Compensation, 32 EMORY L.J. 857 (1983).
14. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
15. Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
16. See Note, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: A Final Requiem for the Public Use
Limitation of Eminent Domain, 60 NoTmE DMAm L. REv. 388 (1985); Note, Reexamining the Supreme
Court's View of the Taking Clause, 58 TEx. L. REv. 1447 (1980); Meidinger, The Public Uses of
Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENV'T L. REV. 109 (1980); Comment, The Public Use
Limitation in Eminent Domain: Handley v. Cook, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 357 (1979); Berger, The Public
Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. Rav. 203 (1978); Note, State Constitutional Lim-
itations on the Power of Eminent Domain, 77 HAIy. L. Rav. 717 (1964). See also Paul, Public Use:
A Vanishing Limitation on Governmental Takings, 4 CATO J. 835 (1985) (part of a conference on
"Economic Liberties and the Judiciary").
17. Absent constitutional amendment, the validity of the judiciary's declaring any constitutional
provision to be a dead-letter is highly questionable. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428
(1956) ("Nothing new can be put into the Constitution except through the amendatory process. Nothing
old can be taken out without the same process."); Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Doc-
ument, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 4, 25 (1987) ("Constitutional provisions protecting personal liberties
are no more emphatic or broadly worded than those protecting economic liberties."). Judge Posner
cited F. McDoNALD, VE nm PaoPLE: THE EcoNoMIc Oaiomns OF nE CoNsTITUTIoN (1958), as an
able refutation of Charles Beard's thesis that "the purpose of the Constitution was to redistribute
wealth from the poorfl ... to the upper class .... " Posner, supra, at 4.
[Vol. 92
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss1/7
ECONOMIC LIBERTY
do with human beings, with their welfare, aspirations, or freedoms ... is a per-
nicious notion, . . . that characterizes much American political thought. It leads
to the conclusion that economic rights and liberties are qualitatively distinct from,
and fundamentally inferior to other noble human values called civil rights, about
which we should be more generous .... Few of us, I suspect, would have much
difficulty choosing between the right to own property and the right to receive a
Miranda warning ....
Human liberties of various types are dependent on one another, and it may well
be that the most humble of them is indispensable to the others-the firmament
... upon which the high spires of the most exalted freedoms ultimately rest ....
[In] no society, in any era of history ... [have] high degrees of intellectual and
political freedom ... flourished side by side with a high degree of state control
over ... economic life .... As a practical matter, he who controls my economic
destiny controls ... my life as well."s
Other respected commentators have chronicled the parallel devel-
opment of economic liberties and personal freedoms, concluding that
personal freedoms are only as strong in a nation as its economic
liberties. 19 Thus, both the wisdom and rationale for relegating ec-
onomic liberties to second-class status compared with personal free-
doms is suspect.
The important status that the framers gave and intended that we
should give to economic liberties must not be ignored or minimized.
If we continue to fail to do so, we may likely rediscover the truth
that "[i]n both time and space, democracy fills a very small corner"
18. Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, 4 CATO J. 703, 703-04 (1985). For a good
outline on property's importance to both free enterprise and Marxism, see Pilon, Property Rights,
Takings, and a Free Society, 6 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 165, 168-78 (1983).
19. The direct correlation between economic liberties and "personal freedoms" was documented
in a survey comparing the status of personal and economic freedoms and economic systems in 165
nations, virtually the entire world. LAY COMASSION ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEAcE3G AND THE U.S.
ECONOMY, TowARD Tm FUTURE: CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE U.S. ECONOMY, App. 11 (1984)
(citing Wright, A Survey of Economic Freedoms, 64 FREEDOM AT ISSUE 15 (1982)). See generally FREE
TRADE: TiE NECESSARY FOUNDATION FOR WORLD PEACE (1985) (concluding that free trade is a pre-
requisite for lasting world peace). See also Pool, How Powerful is Business?, DoEs BIG Busniss
CONTROL AMERICA? 23-24 (R. Hessen ed., 1981) (quoting LINDBOLM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: Tm
WORLD's PoLrrrCAL-ECoNo.IC SYSmMS 5 (1977)) ("Liberal democracy has arisen only in nations that
are market-oriented.").
Harvard Government Professor James Q. Wilson noted that "[t]hough not all market-oriented
systems are democratic, every democratic system is also market-oriented." Wilson, Democracy and
the Corporation. Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1978, at 14, col. 4. Even Professor Lawrence Tribe acknowledges
that "people bound under the weight of poverty [or loss of economic liberty] are unlikely to stand
up for their constitutional rights." L. TIuEE, AMERICAN CONSTIrUTONAL LAW 574 (1978).
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of world history and "may ... turn out to have been ... a brief
parenthesis that is closing before our very eyes." ' 20 After all, "[tihe
free [market] economy is relatively youthful, and back beyond the
eighteenth century one finds only the grim reality of static subsis-
tence economies" and human misery. 21 Government-controlled econ-
omies are not the wave of the future but the curse of a discredited
past, not a Brave New World but the Same Old Story.
II. PUBLIC USE
Originally, the Supreme Court stoutly defended the right to pre-
vent the involuntary transfer by eminent domain of one's private
property to another individual, a concept which was honored until
relatively recently.22 However, as time passed, the Supreme Court
began to assume a less protective posture regarding public use issues,
and the Court has not invalidated a taking on public use grounds
since 1937.23
While "the question of what is a public use is [technically] a
judicial one," 4 the Supreme Court will uphold any statute author-
izing eminent domain "unless its invalidity is plain and apparent
. ".. 25 Thus, the Court maintains the view that questions as to
"the necessity and expediency of... taking.., property for public
use 'are legislative questions,' " regardless which administrative
20. J. REVEL, How DIMocRAcIs PERISH 1 (1983). See also HOLLANDER, THE SutvrvAL oF Tm
ADVERsAY CuLnTur 4 (1988) ("[The possession of higher education and high expectations ...
create[s] a socially critical disposition of an intense, radical and indignant variety that overlooks the
positive aspects of the society.").
21. Beckwith, What Should Lawyers Do?: An Essay on Lawyers, the Free Economy, Redis-
tribution, and Democratic Legitimacy, 16 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 2 (1986). Socialism's scarcity, not the
free market's usual abundance, produces totalitarianism. Ladd, Secular and Religious America in
UNSECuLAR AMERICA 24 (R. Neuhaus, ed. 1986) ("Only when there is ... no possibility of most
people living beyond bare subsistence will the majority ... consent to [a] ... privileged elite. The
rule of an aristocracy is tenable only in scarcity-bound societies.").
22. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). As recently as 1934, Justice McReynolds
stated, "The Legislature cannot lawfully destroy guaranteed rights of one man with the prime purpose
of enriching another, even if for the moment, this may seem advantageous to the public." Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S, 502, 558 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
23. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 79-80 (1937).
24. United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1947).
25. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896) (condemning the Gettysburg
civil war battlefield to create a national monument).
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agency has been redelegated with authority to make that decision. 26
In 1923, the Supreme Court, noted that this modern approach
gave public use an expansive definition:
It is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion,
... directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order [that it] constitute
a public use .... Public uses are not limited, in the modern view, to matters
of mere business necessity and ordinary convenience, but may extend to matters
of public health, recreation and enjoyment.-
Thus, public use was defined to include virtually any activity in-
volving a governmental agency, regardless of how few members of
the public would actually benefit therefrom.
This trend accelerated in 1954 when the Supreme Court upheld
the District of Columbia's taking, as part of an urban renewal pro-
gram, a commercial building that met local health and safety codes
and conveying it to a private developer. 28 Writing for the Court,
Justice Douglas said that the legislature and administrative agencies
acting on the legislature's behalf, rather than the judiciary, are the
main guardians of public needs because a determination of public
interest is essentially conclusive whenever a legislature or adminis-
trative agency has spoken. 29 Thus, he opined that the judiciary has
an extremely narrow role in determining whether the power being
exercised is for a public purpose. 0 He underscored this point by
noting that the uses for which government may condemn property
are virtually limitless:
The concept of the public welfare [public use] is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of legislature to determine that the community should be beau-
tiful as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled .... If those
who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be
26. North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 284 (1925) (quoting Bragg v. Weaver,
251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919)). One exception to the "political question" rule occurs when the legislative
or administrative determination of exigency or need "involve[s] an impossibility." Welch, 327 U.S.
at 552.
27. Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923).
28. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
29. Id. at 32. However, Berman has brought mixed blessings. See Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) ("aesthetics" cited to uphold multifamily exclusionary zoning ordinance).
30. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
19891
13
Houle: Eminent Domain, Police Power, and Business Regulation: Economic L
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands
in the way."
Despite the misplaced optimism of Justice Douglas' hopeful view
on government's capacity to encourage benevolent and nurturing
change, the reality is usually less sanguine. Experience shows that
"lawmakers and bureaucrats design statutes and regulations to ben-
efit private, divisible groups . . . commonly called interest groups,
and that the cost of these statutes and regulations ordinarily ...
fall on the population in general." ' 32 While this may seem harsh or
cynical, one need only reflect momentarily to recall the framers'
view of humanity's limited capacity for perfection and the need to
guard against natural human frailty by means of constant checks-
and-balances-and read the newspaper regularly-to confirm this.
33
Government regulation almost always has fallen and continues to
fall hardest on the "little guy" worker, consumer, or property-owner.
In 1946, the Supreme Court noted that "[n]o case is recalled
where this Court has condemned as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment a taking upheld by the state court as a taking for public
uses in conformity with its laws." 34 This unfortunate trend continued
unabated in the 1984 Supreme Court holding in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff.35 Midkiff involved rather unique circum-
stances. As originally settled by the Polynesians, Hawaii's "economy
[included] . . . a feudal land tenure system .... [with] no private
ownership of land. '3 6 As of the mid-1960's, the state and federal
governments owned about 49% of Hawaii's land and only 72 private
31. Id. at 33. (citation omitted) (citing Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424
(1952)).
32. Aranson, Judicial Control of the Political Branches: Public Purpose and Public Law, 4
CATO J. 719, 730 (1985). See also Eastern R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 132 (1961) (noting that special-interest pressures are "normal[] ... in our political
system"); THE FEDE.ALIST Nos. 10, 51 (J. Madison) (discussing the almost overwhelming power of
the legislature and its abuse by "factions"); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. Rv. 29 (1985).
33. "[C]ourts must not be blind as judges to what they know as men." S. HOFSTADTER & 0.
HoRownz, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 263 (1964).
34. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S. at 551 (quoting Hairston v. Danville &
Western Ry., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908)).
35. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
36. Id. at 232.
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owners held another 47% (including 22 owners who held 72.5% of
that privately-held portion).37 As a result, the Hawaii "legislature
concluded that concentrated land ownership was responsible for
skewing the State's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices,
and the public tranquility and welfare." 38 The landowners "claimed
that the federal tax laws [on capital gains] were the primary reason[s]
they previously had chosen to lease, . . . [rather than to] sell, their
lands." 39 However, "[b]y condemning the land in question, ...
[Hawaii made] the federal tax consequences less severe while still
facilitating the redistribution of fees simple.' ' 4"
Although the Supreme Court could have limited its public use
analysis and the scope of this decision to Hawaii's unique history,
it chose instead to frame its opinion broadly. Reiterating the narrow
role it must play in reviewing a legislative determination of public
use, the Court stated that it "will not substitute its judgment for
a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use 'unless
the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.' "41 The Supreme
Court added that an eminent domain statute would be upheld unless,
on its face, the means authorized could not possibly achieve its stated
goal despite its practical effects:
Of course, this Act, like any other, may not be successful in achieving its intended
goals. But 'whether in fact the provision will accomplish its objectives goals is
not the question: the [Constitution] is satisfied if. . .the ... [state] ... rationally
could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective.' When the leg-
islature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, . . . empirical
... debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation... are
not to be carried out in the federal courts. Redistribution of fees simple to correct
37. Id. This fact, which likely played an important part in the decision, may have as-yet un-
foreseen consequences on American Indian land claims, especially those which would place large
portions of a State's land mass in a few hands. If Hawaii could claim that divestiture was a public
use, such reasoning may well be extended to deny American Indian claims for specific performance
under existing treaties or return of lands allegedly wrongfully taken decades ago, leaving them with
monetary claims only. See also Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (upholding war-time rent-
control while noting that ownership was "monopolized in comparatively few hands").
38. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232.
39. Id. at 233.
40. Id.
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deficiencies in the market. . . is a rational exercise of the eminent domain power.42
That statement has vast implications, given the expansive mass of
"socioeconomic legislation" and the extensive government reorgan-
ization of the economy implicitly approved thereby. In concluding
this point, the Supreme Court stated that government's public use
transfer of private property from one individual to another is per-
missible even though only a tiny segment of the population is ben-
efited:
The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred in
the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having
only a private purpose . . . . 'It is not essential that the entire community, nor
even any considerable portion, ... directly enjoy or participate in any improve-
ment in order ifor it] to constitute a public use.' '[W]hat in its immediate aspect
[is] only a private transaction may ... be raised by its class to a public affair.'
.. In such cases, government does not itself have to use property to legitimate
the taking; it is only the taking's purpose and not its mechanics that must pass
scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.
4'
42. Id. at 242-43 (citations omitted) (quoting Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equal-
ization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981)) (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456
(1981); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979)). In an earlier case, the Court stated, "[r]egardless of
the ultimate economic efficacy of the statute .... it bears a reasonable relation to the State's legitimate
purpose .... ." Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1978). However, the
Supreme Court in Midkiff did not mention Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), where
the Court had earlier noted that "[ihe application of a general zoning law to [a] particular property
effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests." Id. at 260.
Thus, Agins should require government to make more than a minimal showing that a particular law
was rational but instead prove that the action "substantially advanced legitimate state interests." See
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985) (citing Agins, 477 U.S. 255);
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981) (citing Agins, 477 U.S. 255). In Midkiff,
the Supreme Court noted the possibility that less deference would be given when government does
not intend to effect a taking than where it does. 467 U.S. at 241 ("the 'order in question was not,
and was not claimed to be, ... a taking of private property for a public use under ... eminent
domain' ") (quoting and distinguishing Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 416 (1896)).
Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Alex Kozinski stated that:
It makes considerable sense to give greater deference to the legislature where it deliberately
resorts to its eminent domain power than where it may have stumbled into exercising it
through actions that incidentally result in a taking. In the former case, the court is validating
the will of the legislature; in the latter, it may be thwarting the legislative will by ordering
compensation where the legislature had no intention of engaging in [a] compensable trans-
action.
Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 797 F.2d 1493, 1503 n.25 (9th Cir. 1986).
43. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243-44 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Rindge Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921)).
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The Supreme Court ended by noting that takings by states and mu-
nicipalities were subject to no greater standard of review than those
by federal agencies because "[s]tate legislatures are as capable as
Congress of making such determinations within their respective
spheres of authority.'' 44 In a footnote, the Supreme Court added
that it was "worth noting that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
S.. contain an independent 'public use' requirement" so that "[i]t
would be ironic to find that state legislation is subject to greater
scrutiny" than federal takings. 45 That attitude of strict or pro-gov-
ernment construction of the fourteenth amendment's cryptic due
process and equal protection clauses as applied to economic liberties
contrasts sharply with the Supreme Court's usually expansive reading
of the very same constitutional guarantees in the context of personal
freedoms.
One respected commentator, reviewing Midkiff, concluded that
"the Court was actually saying ... that the floodgates are now
open, that almost any statute having a [colorably] reasonable re-
lation to the 'public interest' will be sustained-even if it sanctions
what amounts to a'private taking." ' 46 Thus, current case-law holds
that eminent domain takings are, in effect, non-justiciable, absent
obvious fraud or abuse and that state and local governmental takings
will be subjected to no greater (and possibly to less) scrutiny than
those by federal agencies.
III. EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE POLICE POWER: WHEN DOES
REGULATION BECOME A TAKING?
In Midkiff, the Supreme Court stated: "The 'public use' re-
quirement is ... coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police
44. Id. at 244.
45. Id. at 244 n.7. See also Maier v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1059 n.39 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1975) ("Local ordinances are accorded the same Fifth Amendment
due process and 'taking' analysis as state statutes.") (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 592-94 (1962)). Elsewhere, the Supreme Court said that absent "fraud or abuse", it "must
accept" a state agency's empirical or judgmental decision to exercise eminent domain. Morris v. Duby,
274 U.S. 135, 144 (1927). See also Boom Co. v. Patterson. 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1881) (state power of
eminent domain is an inherent attribute of its sovereignty and may be exercised without federal
approval); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 220 (1845); Kohl v. United States, 91
U.S. 367, 372-73 (1875); Robinson v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 421 F.2d 1397, 1398
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
46. Dorn, Introduction - Economic Liberties and the Judiciary, 4 CATO J. 661, 663 (1985).
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powers." 47 That statement unintentionally may have worsened the
situation, given current confused thinking on the matter. The mere
statement that B begins where A ends does not define adequately
the size of their respective dimensions.
Further, any such formula injects a strong element of uncertainty
and an unhealthy dose of virtually absolute government discretion.
The effect of abandoning unvarying principles of economic liberties
for a standardless ad hoc or case-by-case method of adjudication
not only seriously dilutes individual rights in any area but also re-
duces economic planning and litigation to a virtual crap-shoot in
which the outcome is extremely difficult to predict due to the variety
of potential ways in which any single judge or hearing examiner
might weigh the facts. While this may be inherent to some degree
in any system of justice, the express abandonment of fixed principles
for a standardless case-by-case method vests the decision-maker, ad-
ministrative or judicial, with nigh absolute power. Further, it pres-
ents an unhealthy potential for corruption while chilling the exercise
of other freedoms.
That problem is further compounded by the fact that eminent
domain and the police power are "difficult to distinguish consis-
tently . . . so that they are sometimes confused ... [but are] quite
distinct, although analogous[:]"
48
Briefly, eminent domain takes property because it is useful to the public, while
the police power regulates the use of property or impairs rights in property because
the free exercise of these rights is detrimental to public interest; and the police
power, although it may take property, does not, as a general rule, appropriate
it to another use, but destroys the property, while ... eminent domain [takes]
property ... from the owner and transfer[s] [it] to a public agency to be enjoyed
... as its own. 49
However, "[tihere is no set formula [determining] where [police
power] regulation ends and taking begins ... [T]he question de-
47. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
48. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 6 (1965). See also 16A Am. Jun. 2D Constitutional Law §
365 (1979). While, strictly speaking, it may be said that the United States lacks police power, it
nonetheless has similar equally potent powers. See 91 C.J.S. United States § 5 (1965); 77 Am. Jun.
2D United States § 30 (1979).
49. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 6 (1965).
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pends on the particular facts and the necessities of each case." ' 50 In
1980, the Supreme Court stated flatly that regulation became a tak-
ing when it "denie[d] an owner economically viable use of his land."
'5'
As it said years ago, "[tihe general rule ... is that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking .... [T]his is considered to be a
question of degree and . . . cannot be disposed of by general prop-
ositions. '"52 But, in 1982, the Court said that "whether public action
works a taking is ordinarily an ad hoc inquiry." 53
An obvious example of non-compensable police power action is
the destruction of private property in the course of fighting a fire
or containing an epidemic.5 4 The clear cases of non-compensated,
non-possessory regulation involve basic restrictions on use of prop-
erty such as zoning. Whether regulation goes too far is considered
to be a factual issue of degree.5 5 "Although a comparison of values
before and after [regulation] is relevant [to this factual determi-
nation], it is by no means conclusive .... ",56 In fact, the Supreme
Court has upheld a police power regulation that diminished a pro-
perty's value from $800,000 to $60,000 (about 7% of its pre-reg-
ulation value).57
The fact that an owner's property is not the only one affected
by a regulation may result in a denial of any compensation since
the owner is deemed to "share with other owners the benefits and
burdens of [government's] exercise of its police power" without
compensation rather than bear its burdens alone. 8 Thus, wide-spread
50. Id. (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)). See also Freilich, Solving
the 'Taking' Equation: Making the Whole Equal the Sum of Its Parts, 15 URBAN LAWYER 447 (1983).
51. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
52. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922). The Supreme Court has
historically indicated that questions relating to the abuse of legislative regulatory powers were "po-
litical, not judicial." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1878); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 428, 431 (1819).
53. Loretto v. Telepropmpter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982) ("whether
public action works a taking is ordinarily an ad hoc inquiry").
54. See Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 19 (1879); 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 6 (1965).
55. Yuba Goldfields, Inc. v. United States, 723 F.2d 884, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
56. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
57. Id. (citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915)). See also Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
58. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
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"prohibition of the most profitable or beneficial use of... property
[may well facilitate] a finding that [no] taking has occurred." 9 Ac-
cording to the Second Circuit:
[A] taking is less likely to be found when the challenged interference with a
property interest 'arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good,' than when the inter-
ference entails a physical invasion ... by the government. 60
Further, the Federal Circuit stated that determining whether the
United States "acted in a proprietary or governmental-sovereign
capacity is of little, if any, use in Fifth Amendment just compen-
sation analysis." 61 As to non-possessory governmental activity, the
Supreme Court accords particular significance to the following three
factors: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
and, particularly, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the
government action.
62
However, "deprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit
* . . is not . .. sufficient to . . . [support] a taking [claim]. ' ' 63 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
recently stated that neither "the fact that ... [an owner] might have
to sell [his or her] property because of [resulting] financial hardship
... nor the fact that ... [he or she] might be unable to recoup
[his or her] costs required a finding that a taking ... occurred. '" 64
So, as might be suspected, harm to future speculative opportunities
59. Sadowsky v. City of New York, 732 F.2d 312, 317 (2nd Cir. 1984) (citing Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979); Penn Central, 439 U.S. at 125).
60. Id. at 317 (citation omitted) (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
61. Yuba Goldfields, 723 F.2d at 889 (citing Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
62. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125.
63. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436.
64. Sadowsky, 732 F.2d at 318. Two commentators have recently argued well that "one must
abandon abstract calculations which obfuscate the problem .... [and) [i]nstead ... examine the
[particular] hardship[] placed on individuals by such actions," much as tort law requires that defen-
dants take plaintiffs as they find them, not as they would like them to have been (in good health
and able to withstand the injury inflicted). Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on The White River Junction
Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of Five's" View on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of
Property, 19 LoYoLA L.A. L. Rav. 685, 744 (1986).
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and potential profit is not compensable.65 "The crucial inquiry, is
not whether the regulation permits plaintiffs to use the property in
a 'profitable' manner, but whether the ... use allowed by the reg-
ulation is sufficiently desirable to permit property owners to 'sell
the property to someone for that ... [remaining use]'" even if
hardship results. 6 As stated by the Seventh Circuit: "A property
owner must establish that the right lost was 'so essential to the use
or economic value of [the] property that state-authorized limitation
of it amounted to a "taking,"' . . , [Thus, t]he fact that an owner
has suffered a serious hardship begins rather than ends the analy-
SiS. 1 167
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit upheld a Minnesota statute estab-
lishing maximum rates that private nursing-homes with Medicare
patients could charge other non-Medicare private patients. In dis-
tinguishing nursing home owners from public utilities whose owner
must remain in business, the court of appeals said: "Minnesota nurs-
ing homes, unlike public utilities, have freedom to decide whether
to remain in business and thus subject themselves voluntarily to the
limits imposed . . . on the return they obtain for [their] investment
* . , in nursing home operations. ' 68 Presumably, owners could con-
vert nursing homes to other uses, not simply sell them. However,
as noted earlier, California recently denied owners the chance to
convert their property to another, more profitable (or perhaps merely
profitable) use when it upheld an ordinance which required apart-
ment owners to maintain the residential nature of their respective
properties, which were subject to rent control.69
65. Kadson v. United States, 707 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1983). See also, United States v.
Grand River Dam Auth,, 363 U.S. 229, 236 (1960) (frustration of speculative interest is not com-
pensable).
66. Park Avenue Tower Assocs. v. City of New York, 746 F.2d 135, 139 (2nd Cir. 1984). See
also Shaw v, United States, 740 F.2d 932, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (use regulation not invalid "merely
because the result may diminish the value of the property and prevent its most beneficial use"). If
profitability were the test, efficient enterprises would be penalized unfairly.
67. Barbian v. Pangis, 694 F.2d 476, 484 (7th Cir, 1982) (citations omitted) (quoting Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S, 51, 66 (1979)).
68. Minnesota Ass'n of Health Care v. Minnesota Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 742 F.2d 442, 446
(8th Cir. 1984) (citing In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 772-73 (1968)).
69. Nash, 688 P.2d at 896.
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Thus, diminution in value of property due to government ac-
tion-whether through overly restrictive regulation or through public
programs which place undesirable uses nearby-is not compensa-
ble.70 The First Circuit summarized this point well in 1977:
[A] long line of Supreme Court cases establish that ... substantial economic loss
and significant diminution in value alone do not establish compensable takings.
Government hardly could go on [at least as it has] if it could not execute programs
that adversely affect property values without paying for every such change, and
the Court has held ... that governmental actions destroying recognized economic
interests do not constitute a taking. [T]he frustration of speculative expectations
.. [is] not ... compensable. The recent cases ... suggest that ... takings exist
only when the diminution in values amounts to the total destruction of the value
of . . . [the property]. 7 1
In 1978, the Supreme Court again stated that it had and would
uphold "land-use regulations that destroyed ... recognized ...
property interests" while leaving some residual value 2.7 The Court
also said that the fact that a regulation "has a more severe impact
on some landowners than others, ... does not mean that the law
effects a 'taking."'1 73
Thus, while "damages are recoverable for inverse condemna-
tion,"' 74 it appears that a regulatory inverse condemnation is simply
another way of saying that government regulation must completely
destroy the value of property to constitute a compensable taking.
70. See Florida East Coast Prop. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 572 F.2d 1108, 1111 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978) (diminution in value due to establishing prison work-release
center nearby was not compensable).
71. Ortega Cabrera v. Municipality of Bayamon, 562 F.2d 91, 100 (1st Cir. 1977) (emphasis
added) (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S 40, 48 (1960) on the "total destruction of the
value" test).
72. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125. Apparently this is another way of saying that as long as
the owner is able to sell property for any use, however humble, no "taking" has occurred.
73. Id. at 133.
74. Martino v. Santa Clara Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
75. See Park Avenue Tower, 746 F.2d at 140 ("the suggestion that the city may not cause the
loss of a reasonable return is merely another way of arguing that it may not impair the value of ...
property") (citing William C. Haas & Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117,
1120-21 (9th Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980)). See also Yuba Goldfields, 723 F.2d at
887 ("payment of just compensation is equally attributable to ... 'inverse condemnation' "); id. at
889 ("What counts is not what the government said it was doing ... or what its intent was ....
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Accordingly, a municipality's temporarily freezing or phasing-in new
real estate development is not compensable.
76
In concluding this point, it should be asked what the courts mean
in saying that lost "speculative" value in property need not be com-
pensated. If by "speculative" the courts mean to include sudden,
unpredictable increases in value due to unforeseen events, the fair-
ness of that position seems clear. However, if the courts mean that
owners may not recoup clearly foreseeable and anticipated future
gain that would quite probably have accrued in the absence of gov-
ernmental intervention, that is another matter. Granted that our
ability to predict the future or estimate future appreciation is finite,
it, nonetheless, seems that an owner should be able to collect for
loss to probable expected future gain. After all, a probability test
as to future worth or earnings is used constantly in personal injury
tort actions, among other types of actions, and should be used here
as well.
A. Threatened Exercise of Eminent Domain
Normally, the government is not liable for diminution in value
resulting from its public contemplation of the exercise of eminent
76. See Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003; National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965). See also Note, Phased Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land Development,
26 STr. L. Rnv. 585, 606 (1974).
However, land-use restrictions may not serve as a means of excluding low-income housing. See
Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972); Kennedy Park Homes
Ass'n v. City of Lackawana, 436 F.2d 108 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); United
States v. City of Parma, 471 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Southern Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); In re Kit Mar Builders, 439 Pa.
466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390
(1959). Proof of discrimination, however, must satisfy the "intent" rather than "effects" evidentiary
standard. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (discussing exclusionary zoning). But the dif-
ference between the "tests" may not be great. Id. at 253-54. But see City of Eastlake v. Forrest City
Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (upholding alleged racially discriminatory housing referendum process
despite strong state court finding of discriminatory effect); Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo,
528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1068, on remand, 558 F.2d 350 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1978) (showing lack of receptivity to exclusionary zoning suit). However,
the effectiveness of "inclusionary" zoning and supposedly ameliorative laws such as rent control seem
to have harmful long-term effects on maintaining an adequate stock of low-income housing. See
Ellickson, The Irony of 'Inclusionary' Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 1167 (1981); Symposium, Redis-
tribution of Income Through Regulation in Housing, 32 EMORY L.J. 691 (1983).
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domain.7 This is in keeping with the rule that "the government...
[is not] required to pay the enhanced value [or diminution] which
its demand alone has created." '78 Compensation should, however, be
available for such diminished value once condemnation occurs if
government unreasonably prolongs the deliberation process. This is
especially true after the government has publicized its consideration
of taking specific eminent domain action.
79
B. Physical Occupations and Invasions
Minor permanent physical occupations are compensable. In 1978,
the Supreme Court invalidated a New York statute which required
apartment building owners to permit placement, without compen-
sation, of cable television equipment on their rental property in order
for their tenants to receive cable service, despite the fact that the
equipment was only the size of a bread box.80 The Court held that
a "permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a
taking without regard to the public interest it may serve .... 81
Thus, the character of the government action was the determining
factor in resolving whether the action constituted a taking. The Court
found that compensation was due in cases involving a permanent
physical invasion "without regard to whether the action achieves an
important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on
the owner." 82
A temporary physical invasion, on the other hand, may be non-
possessory and non-compensable under eminent domain theory (al-
though actionable as a tort for trespass, nuisance, or negligence),
depending on its nature, extent, and duration. As the Supreme Court
noted in the cable television case cited above, "[tlhis Court has
77. See Allain-Lebreton Co. v. Department of the Army, 670 F.2d 43, 45 (5th Cir. 1982),
78. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 333 (1949).
79. See Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933) (flood condemnation); United States
v. Rogers, 255 U.S. 163, 169 (1921) (delay in computing compensation after condemnation); Orono.
Veazie Water Dist. v. Penobscot County Water Co., 348 A.2d 249, 256 (Me. 1975) (invalidating a
six-month delay in computing compensation).
80. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37 ("[C]onstitutional protection cannot depend on the size of the
area permanently occupied . . .
81. Id. at 426.
82. Id. at 434-35. See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
[Vol. 92
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consistently distinguished between .. cases involving a permanent
physical occupation ... or government action outside the owner's
property that causes consequential damages .... A taking has been
found only in the former situation." 8 One noted commentator has
surmised that "an interference ... for more than a momentary
period ... [constitutes] taking of property in the constitutional sense,
whether there has been any formal condemnation or not."' 84 How-
ever, occasional, intermittent invasions, which do not constitute tak-
ings, nevertheless should be actionable in tort.85 Thus, the wise
practitioner may wish to file eminent domain and tort actions
simultaneously because eminent domain actions "do not involve a
tort, and are not ... strictly speaking, civil actions or suits."8$6
IV. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF CONDEMNATION
A. Pre-Condemnation Hearing
Often, if not almost always, the only real issue to be adjudicated
in an eminent domain action is the amount of compensation due.
After all, the government may, due to the exigency of a situation,
summarily take property and give the owner a hearing later.8 7 How-
ever, it appears that the owner must be provided a hearing before
83. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428. Of course, government's war powers might well permit uncom-
pensated action akin to an "occupation." See United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S.
155 (1958) (upholding war-time closing of gold mine so that workers and equipment could be used
to mine minerals needed in war effort).
"The one incontestable case for compensation ... occur[s] when the government . . 'regularly'
use[s], or 'permanently' occup[ies], space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be under
private ownership." Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HAuv. L. Rav. 1165, 1184 (1967) (footnote omitted). The
Supreme Court has quoted Professor Michelman's article with approval in Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427
n.5.
84. 2 J. SAcKmAN, NicuoLs ON EImTENT DoMAIN § 6.111] (3rd ed. 1981).
85. As to an owner's right to sue under non-eminent domain tort theories, see 30 C.J.S. Eminent
Domain §§ 394, 400 n.36 (citing City of Grand Prairie v. AT&T, 405 F.2d 1144, 1146-48 (5th Cir.
1969); Cheatham v. Carter County, 363 F.2d 582, 586 (6th Cir. 1966)).
86. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 209 (1965).
87. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 340 (1963) (government "may take
property without a court order, or by instituting condemnation proceedings"). But see Ackerman &
Yanich, Eminent Domain: The Constitutionality of Condemnation Quick-Take Statutes, 60 U. DETRorr
J. URaAN LAw 1 (1982).
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the government destroys "property of great value" pursuant to the
police power."
B. Just Compensation
As noted earlier, the amount of compensation due is not affected
by a rise in value related to the government's urgent need for the
property or goods taken.89 In general, just compensation is "what
a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller [under normal
conditions]." 90 Accordingly, "just compensation must be measured
by an objective standard that disregards subjective values which are
only of significance to an individual owner." 9'
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Absent a statutory requirement, an owner need not exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies if he or she is only seeking compensation (rather
than questioning the validity of the use of eminent domain on other
grounds). 92 But a legislature may, if it chooses, properly "insist[]
on [an owner's] exhausting administrative proceedings for a deter-
mination of the validity of those claims." 93
D. Standing
"Only the owner.., at the time of the.., taking has standing"
to sue for just compensation, absent a valid assignment. 94
88. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14041 (1894) (distinguishing "property... of great value"
from "property of ... trifling value"). In Lawton, the Supreme Court rejected a nuisance-per-se
test as to the type of property that could be summarily destroyed, saying that "[m]any articles ...
are perfectly harmless in themselves, but may become nuisances by being put to an illegal use, and
in such cases ...may be summarily destroyed." Id. at 142. Perhaps the dollar amount used in
criminal statutes in distinguishing between petty and grand larceny could serve as a ready determination
of "great value," at least if a statute had been amended recently to adjust for inflation.
89. Cors, 337 U.S. at 333.
90. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 26 n.1 (1984) (citing United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)).
91. Id. at 35.
92. Morton Thiokol, Inc. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 625 (1984). The United States Claims
Court's jurisdiction is listed at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). In 1981, the United States Claims Court
assumed the trial functions held by the now-defunct Court of Claims.
93. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. at 340.
94. United States Olympic Comm. v. Intelicense, S.A., 737 F.2d 263, 268 (2nd Cir. 1984) (citing
United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 20-21 (1958)). See also 26 AM. Jui. 2D Eminent Domain §§ 247-
298; 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 196.
26




Injunctive relief is usually unavailable in eminent domain actions
because just compensation is deemed to be an adequate remedy at
law for purposes of equitable jurisdiction.9 5 The owner may obtain
injunctive relief, however, where there is a "question of the unlawful
or improper [bad faith] exercise of the power of eminent domain,"
where there is an "attempted misuse of the power delegated,' '96 or
where the statutory authority to condemn or the condemnation pro-
ceeding itself is void for any reason.
9 7
In 1984, the District of Columbia Circuit summed up this rule
by stating that equitable relief is available "when [a condemnation
is] ... wholly outside the scope of the power granted.., by statute
or constitutional provision." 8 The court noted that the fifth amend-
ment's requirement of "just compensation ... defines the govern-
95. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (citations omitted) (quoting
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 697 n.18 (1949); Hurley v. Kincaid,
285 U.S. 95 (1932)):
Equitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public
use ... when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to
the taking. The Fifth Amendment does not require that compensation precede the taking.
Generally, an individual claiming that the United States has taken his property can seek
compensation under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 [before the Claims Court].
See also Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 483 (1924) ("The taking is a legislative and
not a judicial function, and an opportunity to be heard in advance need not be given."); Ackerman
& Yanich, supra note 87, at 1.
96. 27 Am. Jum. 2D Eminent Domain § 485 n.16 (citing United States v. Central Eureka Mining
Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958)). See also 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 401-09 (1965).
97. AM. Jum. 2D Eminent Domain § 486 n.8 (citing Henry Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fibre
Co., 280 U.S. 369, 377 (1930)). However, administrative agencies usually lack authority to adjudicate
constitutional issues. Matos v. Secretary of HEW, 581 F.2d 282, 286 n.6 (1st Cir. 1978) ("Consti-
tutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing[s]") (quoting Califano
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977)). See also Robinson v. United States, 718 F.2d 336, 338 (10th
Cir. 1983) ("[T]he agency may provide its views about the statute ... [but] may not declare [it]
unconstitutional.. . ."). Thus, owners raising non-frivolous constitutional challenges to takings would
seem able to avoid exhausting administrative remedies. But see Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co.,
347 U.S. 535, 553 (1954); Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v, Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 767-68, 772 (1947)
(administrative exhaustion required even when serious constitutional claim raised); Tutun v. United
States, 270 U.S. 568, 576 (1926) ("The United States may create rights in individuals against itself
and provide only an administrative remedy."). Further, an official not directly removable by another
"interested" official may determine just compensation, even though an employee of the condemnor
agency. See Hortonville Joint School District No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 491-
92 (1976); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 54-55 (1975).
98. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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ment's ... powers of eminent domain [but] ... does not embody
a remedial principle in equity that ... damages are fully adequate
.... "99 The court continued:
From the earliest times, courts in equity have considered an injury to real property
to be irremediable at law. The uniqueness of land typically makes damages an
inadequate remedy. Equity will not hesitate to enjoin an unconstitutional taking
and even a repeated trespass or other nuisance to land.lw
It also listed loss of a going business as "another category of injuries
that equity considers irremedial at law.
' 10 1
F. Statutory Construction
Unlike most statutes granting governmental authority, a statute
authorizing use of eminent domain should be strictly construed. 02
Furthermore, a statute which authorizes the public taking of private
property must be construed to implicitly provide for just compen-
sation whenever possible. 103 While compensation is usually made in
cash, there seems to be no federal constitutional prohibition of pay-
ment by means of an investment-worthy security with a readily-
determined value, in the absence of some contrary statutory pro-
vision. 104
G. Judicial Review
As noted earlier, the issue of public exigency or the need to
condemn all or part of a particular property is generally a political
99. Id. at 1527 n.l16 (citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682,
704 (1949)).
100. Id. at 1527-28 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Erhardt
v. Boaro, 113 U.S. 537 (1885)).
101. Id. at 1528 (citing Semmes Motors Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1205 (2nd Cir.
1970) (loss of automobile dealer franchise)).
102. See 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 214 & nn.11-12 (1965).
103. Id. §§ 98 n.92, 99 n.99, 100 n.2.
104. See Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 151 (1974) ("The im-
plication of other decisions is that consideration other than cash ... may be counted in the deter-
mination of just compensation ... ."). But see Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 DalU.) 304,
315 (1795) ("No ... compensation can be made except in money .... It. . . is an universal medium,
easily portable, liable to little variation, and readily exchanged for any kind of property."). The
author believes that the latter description of "compensation" would easily apply to stable over-the-
counter government securities, but not widely-fluctuating, "junk" or difficult-to-sell bonds or notes
with a limited market. The wise practitioner should specify in a settlement agreement the exact type
of non-money compensation to be paid, if any, or that payment be in cash.
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or legislative question which is not subject to judicial review. 105 On
the other hand, the issue as to what constitutes public use 06 or just
compensation 0 7 is subject to judicial review, however limited. Al-
though the initial determination of just compensation may be made
administratively, it is likewise subject to limited judicial review.
108
But it is the owner challenging the validity of any taking or com-
pensation award who has the burden of proving that the admin-
istrative determination was clearly erroneous 109
V. EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE STATES
A state's eminent domain authority does not hinge on federal
permission to exercise itilo or require that it be delegated to state
or local agencies.' As might be suspected, state delegations of em-
inent domain authority to municipalities seldom present questions
of federal law." 2 However, the fifth amendment's limits on eminent
domain apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
1 3
A discussion of eminent domain as applied to the states would
not be complete without at least mentioning state Mill Act rules.
Under these acts, many states held that riparian land owners were
constitutionally permitted to dam rivers and streams for mill pur-
poses, provided that they paid compensation to the upper riparian
owners whose land was consequently flooded without their con-
105. See J. REVEL, How DEMOCRACmS PERISH (1983).
106. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240,
107. See Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 59 (1919) ("[I]t is essential to due process that the mode
of determining the compensation be such as to afford the owner an opportunity to be heard.").
108. Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 569 (1898) ("It is within the power
of the States to provide that the amount [of compensation] shall be determined in the first instance
by [administrative] commissioners, subject to an appeal to the courts for trial in the ordinary way
.... "). See also Behm v. Division of Admin., 383 So, 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1980); State Hwy. Bd. v.
Shepard, 127 Vt. 525, 530, 253 A.2d 155, 159 (1969).
109. See Miller v. United States, 620 F.2d 812, 828 (Ct. Cl. 1980). See also Caporal v. United
States, 577 F.2d 113, 118 (10th Cir. 1978) (administrative ruling on amount of compensation will not
be reversed unless clearly erroneous).
110. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 371-72 (1875). See also Boom Co. v. Peterson, 98 U.S.
403, 406 (1878) ("[Elminent domain ... appertains to every independent government .... [I]t is
an attribute of sovereignty.").
Ill. See District of Columbia v. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 108 (1953).
112. See e.g., Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 479, 483 (1923).
113. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 623 n.1 (1981). See also
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980).
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sent. 114 In those states, the takings without consent were upheld on
the basis of public necessity because members of the general public,
including the affected riparian owners, received sufficient benefits
from the operation of a nearby mill to justify such takings. 115 The
Mill Act rule has had an interesting history in Massachusetts, which
only grew to accept this rationale in 1927.116 However, as early as
1819, perhaps reflecting the spirit and intent of the federal framers,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had stated that "[i]l
... must be admitted that, by the principles of every free govern-
ment, and of our constitution in particular, it is not in the power
of the legislature to create a debt [or servitude] from one person to
another ... without ... the consent of the [injured] party.... ,117
Agreement on the validity of the Mill Act rule was far from
unanimous. Many states rejected it,118 as did the Supreme Court in
1874.119 However, the spirit of the Mill Act rule lives on even today,
as can be seen in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.120 But any
justification for a state's exercising or delegating eminent domain
in any form should be restricted to documented, pre-exercise public
needs, not post-taking rationalizations.121
VI. BusnEss REGULATION
Like government's power in eminent domain, its authority to
regulate business is broad and pervasive. Recent examples are the
Supreme Court decisions upholding the following: (1) a North Da-
114. See 2A J. SACKMClAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT Do AiN § 7.70 (rev. 3rd ed. 1987).
115. Id. (citing Head v. Amoskeag Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885); Blair v. County of Cuming, III
U.S. 363 (1884)).
116. Dickinson v. New England Power Co., 257 Mass. 108, 110-11, 153 N.E. 458, 459-60 (1926),
cert. denied, 273 U.S. 748 (1927).
117. Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 75, 83 (1819).
118. See 2A J. SAC1mAN, supra note 114, § 7.7011] (citing, e.g., Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist., 204
Ill. 576, 68 N.E.2d 522 (1903); New England Trout & Salmon Club v. Mather, 68 Vt. 338, 35 A.
323 (1896)).
119. See Loan Ass'n Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 664-65 (1874) (rejecting use of eminent
domain to condemn property for redevelopment by large employer).
120. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
121. For examples of this salutary rule in the context of public employees' First Amendment
freedoms, see Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279, 1285-86 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States ex. rel.
Cluckman v. Laird, 469 F.2d 773, 783 (2d Cir. 1972) (rejecting after-the-fact rationalizations).
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kota statute which required any corporation operating a pharmacy
to have a majority of its shares owned by pharmacists who are
actively engaged in the pharmacy's management despite the fact that
larger drug store chains could provide drugs more cheaply; 22 (2) a
New Orleans ordinance outlawing push-cart vendors who had not
already been in business for at least eight years; 123 (3) a California
statute requiring newly established auto dealers to obtain permission
from a state agency prior to opening for business if any existing
area auto dealer objected to the new entrant;' 24 and (4) a Maryland
statute prohibiting oil refiners from operating retail gas stations,
despite the higher consumer prices resulting from the state's man-
datory regulation. 125 Finally, there is the landmark decision of Kotch
v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners26 in which the Supreme
Court strained to uphold a river pilot licensing statute which virtually
legalized nepotism and was particularly discriminatory in practice to
women and minorities.
VII. EcONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE PRocEss AND JUDIcAL
ACTIVISM
Given the woeful state of economic liberties in this nation, con-
sideration should be given to the legal justification for treating ec-
onomic liberties as second-class freedoms while viewing other
guarantees of the same Bill of Rights as somehow "preferred." As
will be seen, the difference in treatment of those two branches of
the Bill of Rights cannot be justified. Further, it is well within the
judiciary's power to extricate us from the current situation in which
we find ourselves, considering that it was the judiciary's interpre-
tation of the Constitution that put us there and that a return to
sounder, earlier case-law is a task uniquely within the judiciary's
competence.
122. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
123. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976).
124. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 106-07 (1978). The number
of lost jobs and consumer prices increased with restrictions on competition. Smith, Franchise Reg-
ulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restriction on Automobile Distributors, 25 J. op L. & ECON.
125 (1982).
125. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 125, 147-48 (1978).
126. 330 U.S. 552 (1948).
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"Economic substantive due process" has been used interchange-
ably with "substantive due process.'1 27 It is that reservoir of perhaps
unexpressed constitutional guarantees that protects against excessive
government control or deprivation no matter how much procedural
fairness is given. 128 As one district court has noted: "Substantive
due process encompasses those few select rights, not specifically enu-
merated in the constitution, which have nonetheless been deemed
... to be 'fundamental to our system of ordered liberty.' ,,129 Sub-
stantive due process, according to the Supreme Court, "restrains
state action, whether legislative, executive or judicial."' 30
Reminiscent of Mark Twain's premature obituary, reports of
substantive due process' death are greatly exaggerated since sub-
stantive due process has been recognized recently at both federal
and state levels.13' The Supreme Court supposedly abandoned sub-
stantive due process when it upheld the conviction of a retail grocer
127. See Dorn, Introduction, Economic Liberties and Judiciary, 4 CATo J. 661 (1985); Pilon,
Legislative Activism, Judicial Activism, and the Decline of Private Sovereignty, 4 CATO J. 813, 819
n.29 (1985) (quoting an October 1981 speech by then-Attorney General William French Smith); Kelso,
Substantive Due Process as a Limit on Police Power Regulatory Takings, 20 WVIatamFE L. Rav. I
(1984). See also WOLFE, TnE RisE OF MODERN JuDIcuL REviEw, 144-63 (1986); Cronnon v. Alabama,
557 F.2d 472, 473 n,1 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[W]hether a given practice is so unfair as to deny due process
is always a question of federal constitutional law.").
Actions raising substantive due process issues are likely to be resolved on legal grounds with the
relevant facts stipulated or at least not the subject of sharply differing uncorroborated testimony.
Thus, it should be noted that an appellate court need not defer to a trial court's finding of facts
when testimony/creditability issues are not determinative. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374
U.S. 174, 193 (1963) (reviewing "essentially undisputed facts"); Cournoyer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 115
N.H. 60, 62, 333 A.2d 463, 464 (1975) (summarizing rule); Ploog v. Ogilvie, 309 N.W.2d 49, 53
(Minn. 1981) ("Where the critical evidence is documentary, there is no need to defer to the trial
court's assignment of its meaning.").
128. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) ([I]mportant but unar-
ticulated rights ... nonetheless ... share constitutional protection in common with explicit guar-
antees."); Hurtado v, California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884). See also 16A AM. Jun. 2D Constitutional
Law § 816; 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 964; Cooley, CONSTITUOMNAL LIMITATIONS 356 (8th ed.
1927).
129. Hayes v. Johnson, 578 F. Supp. 685, 687 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
130. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111 (1921).
131. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) ("Substantive due process
has at times been a treacherous field for this Court .... But [history] does not counsel [its] aban-
donment."); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup.
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in 1934 for selling about two dollars' worth of milk below the min-
imum price set by New York,
13 2
Addressing the Supreme Court's abdication of economic liberties,
Professor Bernard Siegan stated that "[N]o change has been so dras-
tic as that which occurred in the early 19[30s and] 40s when the
Court abandoned judicial review of economic and social legislation
.... [T]he American government thereafter consisted of only two
branches, not three."' 33 The Supreme Court after all, had abandoned
earlier precedent which had recognized firm and fixed limits on gov-
ernment's prerogative in this area by denigrating those principles as
mere "notions of public policy [which happen to be] embedded in
earlier decisions of the Court ... [which] should not be read into
the Constitution.' ' 3 4 By reducing established constitutional prece-
dence to mere public policy, the Court dangerously cast the legal
system adrift with no permanent or transcendent principles to govern
future adjudication.
The unworkableness of reducing constitutional law to little more
than current mores or an opinion poll was summarized by the Su-
preme Court in 1933 when it noted that "[t]he public policy of one
generation may not . . .be the public policy of another.' 1 35 As it
said in 1866, "[n]o doctrine, involving more pernicious conse-
quences, was ever invented by the [mind] of man than that any of
[the Constitution's] provisions can be suspended [or terminated] dur-
ing any of the great exigencies of government.'
t36
132. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 556-59 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
133. SIEGAN, EcoNoimc LIBERTIES AND TEE CONSTITUTION 3 (1980).
134. Olson v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 247 (1941).
135. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933). Yet in a later case, the Court referred
to economic substantive due process as merely "some particular economic or social philosophy."
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
136. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120 (1866). See also Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273
U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (abhorring idea that the Constitution is anything that
"has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it"); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920);
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-49 (1905) (warning against reducing Constitution
to "the mere reflex of ... popular opinion or passion."). The infamous Dred Scott segregation case,
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), was perhaps the first product of "judicial
activism." C. WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JuIciAL REVIEw: FRom, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 70 (1986). Judicial activism is not inherently "liberal" or "conservative" but
rather involves a refusal to subordinate the courts to the intent of the framers and legislature. Thomas
Sowell, Judicial Activism Reconsidered (1989).
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This very idea was expressed more simply by Justice Sutherland
in the following way: "To miss ... the difference between [inter-
pretation and judicial legislating] is ... to convert what was in-
tended as . . . enduring [legal] mandates into mere moral
reflection."' 3 7 After all, the "Constitution is a written [document].
As such, its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when
adopted it means now."' 13 8 As the Supreme Court wryly observed
in 1795: "The constitution is the origin and measure of legislative
authority .... Not a particle of it should be shaken; not a pebble
of it removed .... [O]ne precedent leads to another; precedent gives
way to precedent; .. .thus the constitution eventually [might be]
destroyed.' 39 Noting the virtual abandonment of that view and the
fact that the Constitution is written and not an oral tradition, Justice
Jackson declared candidly in 1953:
Rightly or wrongly, the belief is widely held by the ... profession that [the]
Court no longer respects ... rules of law but is guided ... by personal [values]
.... [This Court also... generated an impression ... that regard for [sound]
precedents ... is [no longer] absolute, that words no longer mean what they
have always meant . . ., [and] that the law knows no fixed principles.-
Chief Justice Marshall later repudiated his own dictum in Mar-
bury v. Madison14' that the Supreme Court could vary its interpre-
137. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 404 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
Justice Sutherland continued:
[T]o say ... that the words of the Constitution mean today what they did not mean when
written ... is to rob that instrument of the essential element which continues it in force
as the people have made it until they, and not their official agents, have made it otherwise
.... '[S]pecific provisions may... turn out to have been inexpedient. This does not make
those provisions any less binding. Constitutions can not be changed by events alone. They
remain binding ... until ... amended .... '
Id. at 403 (citation omitted) (quoting People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 139 (1865)).
See also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) ("I'd give the [d]evil [the] benefit of [the] law, for
my own safety[] sake") (quoting R. BOLT, A Man For All Seasons, Act I, in THREE PLAYS 147
(Heinemann ed. 1967)).
138. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. at 448-49.
139. Vanhorne's Lesse v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dail.) 304, 315 (1795).
140. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). See also SCM Corp. v.
United States, 675 F.2d 280, 286 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (Nichols, J., dissenting) ("Things have ... reached
the point where the result-oriented jurist will attain the result he desires whatever the words say that
are to be construed."). See also, J. WImmE, WnN WoRDs LosE THEIR MEARINo (1984); J. O'CONNELL,
Tim JUDGES WA 273 (1987).
141. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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tation of the Constitution in light of shifting public sentiment. 142 As
the Supreme Court noted in 1936, the "judicial branch... has only
one duty; to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked
beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former .... and, having done that, its duty
ends."141
Frankly, the Supreme Court's adherence to constitutional history
has been selective at best. 44 The present path on which the judiciary
is generally embarked in this regard seems to ignore Thomas Jef-
ferson's prophetic warning that "if the Constitution were ever de-
stroyed, it would be . . [so] destroyed by construction or
interpretation ... by the Federal judiciary."145 Alexis DeTocqueville
has noted that if "well-meaning but imprudent Justices depart from
previously established constitutional principles, the nation may even-
tually be plunged into anarchy.' 1 46 William Johnson, one of the
ablest of all the Justices, remarked of the need to watch and monitor
closely "the advancement of judicial power, in common with all
power.' ' 147 Justice Frankfurter also added that "[j]udicial power is
not immune against the human weakness [of self-aggrandize-
ment]." 48
If one were to believe that our twentieth-century republic requires
virtually unlimited judicial discretion, candid argument to that effect
should be made rather than relying on penumbras or natural law
to judicially enact "wise" social policy. But, as noted earlier, we
are applying a written Constitution, not an inchoate oral tradition,
142. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387, 399 (1821). See also Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824), in which Chief Justice Marshall said that "the
[j]udicial power is never exercised for ... giving effect to the will of the [j]udge."
143. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936).
144. See Simson, The Role of History in Constitutional Interpretation: A Case Study, 70 Cop.NEa
L. REv. 253 (1985); Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. Rnv. 119, 157.
See also Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretavism and Neutral Principles,
96 HAiv. L. Ray. 781, 787 (1983) (reluctantly acknowledging the historical evidence for a restrained
judicial role as "fairly powerful"). Professor Raoul Berger summed this up well in A Response to
D.A.J. Richards Defense of Freewheeling Constituional Adjudication, 59 IND. L.J. 339 (1984).
145. C. PATTERsON, THE CoNsTrrUoNA PRNciPLEs oF THomAs JEFFERSON 70 (1953).
146. A. DETocQE vILE, DEMOCpACY iN ANMPCA, 150 (1900).
147. Ramsay v. Allegere, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611, 616 (1827) (Johnson, J., concurring).
148. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 119 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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to current issues. Our Constitution is not an enigma requiring a
judicial caste to render its meaning understandable. After all, it was
written by, for, and to the people-a fact too often overlooked by
the judiciary. As Justice Frankfurter noted, the judiciary was not
granted the authority to save the citizenry from itself despite the
judiciary's desire to assume such authority:
The Court is not saved from being oligarchic because it professes to act in the
service of human ends. As history amply proves, the judiciary is prone to mis-
conceive the public good by confounding private notions with constitutional re-
quirements . . . [A] democracy need not rely on the courts to save it from its
own unwisdom. 149
Sincerity is no guarantee for truth, and reliance on natural law
is "not much more than [a] literary garniture [or a judicial fig leaf]
... and not a guiding means for adjudication."' 50 Given the abun-
dance of diametrically opposed and often opaque discussions among
theologians, philosophers, and social scientists on the subject, the
utter uselessness of natural law as an objective standard for adju-
dication and the clear and present invitation for judicial legislating
presented thereby should be obvious to all who objectively consider
the matter."'
149. A.F. of L. v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538, 555-56 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936) ("Courts are not the only agency of government
that must be assumed to have the capacity to govern.").
150. Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 H~Axv. L. Rm. 217, 225 (1955).
See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., for the Court) ("Due process
... is not ... a revival of 'natural law.' "); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70, 75, 90 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 'natural law' theory of the Constitution ... degrade[s] the ... Bill
of Rights" and is "an incongruous excrescence on our Constitution . . . ."): Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
(3 Dallas) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court cannot pronounce [a law] ... void
merely because it is . . . contrary to ... natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated
by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject .... 9).
151. See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 430 (1856) ("[T]he doctrine that there exists in
the judiciary some vague, loose and undefined power to annul law, because ... it is 'contrary to
natural equity and justice,' is in conflict with the first principles of government. . . ."). See also
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S, 533, 624-25 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting):
[Modem] decisions give support to a ... mistaken view of [the] Constitution and the
constitutional function of [the] Court. This view, in a nutshell, is that every major social
ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional 'principle,' and that this Court
should 'take the lead' in promoting reform.... The Constitution is not a panacea for
every blot upon the public welfare, nor should [the] Court ... be . . . a general haven
for reform movements .... [The] Court ... does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds
its authority, even to satisfy justified impatience with the ... political process. For when,
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Despite what some may say, a return to the basic principles of
our written Constitution is not "activism." It is merely an honoring
of the intent of the framers. If indeed the original intent of any
part of the Constitution is lost, a new constitutional convention
should be called promptly. Otherwise, the judiciary is left with no
standard other than popular or elitist mores with which to steer the
continued development of constitutional law. While some may favor
judicial implementation of personal or class views or biases, that
attitude may well undo our hard-won freedoms. When those with
strongly-held contrary beliefs and values are elected to office, they
will impose a much different set of standards than the standards
imposed by their electorally-ousted predecessors. Thus, as noted ear-
lier, the judiciary and constitutional law would be reduced to little
more than a prize in a new version of the "spoils" system. With
no fixed constellation of principled constitutional guarantees, the
foundation needed to prevent radical shifts back-and-forth will sim-
ply cease to exist. Without such an anchor, constitutional jurispru-
dence will drift interminably or be blown about by ever-shifting
winds.
Likewise, stare decisis does not prevent courts from returning to
the original principles of constitutional interpretation. 15 2 Although
seldom (if ever) so stated, stare decisis has been readily abandoned
when the courts are reducing governmental prerogative and ex-
in the name of constitutional interpretation, the Court adds something to the Constitution
.... the Court in reality substitutes its view of what should be [left] for the amending
process.
In Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S, 226, 342 (1964), Justice Black in dissent stated that: "Our duty is
simply to interpret the Constitution, and in doing so the test ... is not whether a law is offensive
to our conscience or to the 'good old common law,' but whether it is offensive to the Constitution."
See also T. COOLEY, A TR1ATss ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LiMNATloNs WHICH REST UPON Tm LEG-
isLAnTvE PowER OF THE STATEs OF THE AmEtiCsA UNION 55 (1972) ("The meaning of the Constitution
is fixed ... and it is not any different at any subsequent time when a court has occasion to pass
upon it.").
152. See Thomas v, Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (1980) ("The doctrine
of stare decisis has a more limited application when the precedent rests on constitutional grounds,
because 'correction through legislative action is practically impossible.' "); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U,S. 649, 665 (1944) ("In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment and
not upon legislative action [the] Court . , . has [freely] exercised its power to reexamine . . , its
constitutional decisions."). See also Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Con-
stitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 467.
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panding individual freedom.153 If anything, a return to the framers'
intent in the area of economic substantive due process should be
relatively easy, given the fact that ample constitutional history and
early post-ratification case-law exists. More recent, erroneous de-
cisions can be overruled because "stare decisis is ... not a ...
formula of adherence to the latest decision ... when such adherence
involves collision with a prior doctrine ... intrinsically sounder, and
verified [on economic liberties by experience]." 15 4 Furthermore, "the
Supreme Court has overruled over 230 of its own precedents in
recent memory, at the urging of the Federal Government." 155 If any-
thing, the decisions nearer to the creation of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights should be given greater weight in constitutional
interpretation than those of much later vintage. 156 This is especially
true when those later decisions are not supported by a solid historical
153. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding
municipalities to be "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1993 in the face of contrary precedent); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 13247, 174-75 n.1 (1973) (recognizing a federal right to abortion); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying "exclusionary rule" to states through fourteenth amendment
despite earlier ruling to the contrary).
This clearly appears to be the motivating spirit behind the rule summarized in 21 C.J.S. Courts
§ 193 (1940) (citing Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)):
The rule of stare decisis is not so imperative ... that error may be perpetuated and grievous
wrong be the result. Accordingly, unless a doctrine or principle has become so ... estab-
lished that it may fairly be [said] to have become a rule of property [vesting rights in private
individuals], . . . the courts will not adhere to it, although established by previous decisions,
if they are convinced that it is erroneous ....
While the principle asserted here seems to have been applied principally, if not exclusively, in the
realm of personal'freedoms, both the spirit and intent of the Constitution and common sense dictate
that it be applied to economic liberties in like measure.
154. Fein, Promoting the President's Policies through Legal Advocacy: An Ethical Imperative
of the Government Attorney, 30 FED. B. NEws & J. 406, 407 (1983) (citing Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, Tim CoNsmrroN oF TH UNTED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND
INTERP ETATiON 1789-91 (1973 & 1982 Supp.)).
155. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). See also United States v. Young, 210 F.
Supp. 640, 641 (W.D. Mo. 1962); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (candid admission that "[d]ecisions of this Court do not have equal intrinsic authority.").
Courts are not to have pillow-like qualities by bearing the imprint of the latest appellate pronounce-
ment. Rather, when faced with divergent lines of cases, "it is the duty of ... court[s] to follow the
decision which it conceives is based on the sounder reasoning." 21 C.J.S. Courts § 192 (1940).
156. The Supreme Court employed this principle in upholding Georgia's capital punishment law,
when it noted that: "At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, capital punishment was a
common sanction in every State. Indeed, the First Congress [which contained many sponsors of the
Eighth Amendment] ... enacted legislation providing death as the penalty for specified crimes."
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
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record or, worse, when they disclaim the need or possibility of se-
curing any such record at all.
After all, it was not until 1958 that the Supreme Court, remi-
niscent of Napoleon crowning himself, first decreed that its "in-
terpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment [and the Constitution
generally] ... is the supreme law of the land" equal to the Con-
stitution itself. 5 7 By this proclamation, the Court ignored the fun-
damental distinction between the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Constitution and the Constitution itself. The Supreme Court
seemed to retreat from this statement in 1984 when it said that
judicial precedent "cannot be read as authorizing a court to [act]
,.. counter to [constitutional and] statutory policy.' 1 58 Thus, con-
sistent with principles of stare decisis, case-law which has errone-
ously interpreted the Constitution should be void ab initio, however
long-standing it may be because "[n]o interest which would be served
by ... an adherence to stare decisis is superior to the demands...
of the Constitution.' ' 159 Further, "stare decisis . . . [should not] be
followed to the extent that error may be perpetuated ... even though
it may have been reasserted . . . a number of [times]."' 60 In short,
"[p]recedence ... can be no justification for the continuance of an
erroneous practice." 61
157. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). The analogy of the Supreme Court's self-indulgent
elevation to Napoleon's crowning of himself is apt, but it is not original. See Kurland, Curia Regis:
Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings and Courts "to Say What the Law Is," 23 Aiuz. L.
REv. 581 (1981). As usual, Professor Raoul Berger has crisply and thoroughly illuminated the legal
and historical issues here. Perhaps due to his retirement, he has spared no one's false pride in discussing
these pressing questions. See Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation"." The Activist Flight from the
Constitution, 47 Omo STATE L.J. 1, 2 (1986) ("For all the rivers of ink since spilled by activists,
there is a veritable sea of apologies for judicial revisionism-they have not, according to Michael
Perry, himself an activist, come up with 'a defensible nonoriginalist conception of constitution text/
interpretation and judicial role' "); Berger, Constitutional Law and The Constitution, 19 SuFoLK
U.L. REV. 1, 2 (1985) ("[A]cademic thinking has gone so far ... as to prompt G. E. White to pose
the satirical question, 'Why not teach a class o[n] constitutional law without the Constitution ...
158. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 583 n.17 (1984).
159. Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657, 665 (1942). See also United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323, 346 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Of course, [while] it is embarrassing to confess a blunder,
it may prove more embarrassing to adhere to it."); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947) (Douglas,
J., for the Court) ("It has not been unknown that judges persist in error to avoid giving the appearance
of weakness and vacillation.").
160. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 193 (1940).
161. Martin v. State, 480 N.E.2d 543, 548 (Ind. 1985). See also Angel v. Seattle First National
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As to the apparent distaste of many constitutional scholars for
historical research and proclivity for free-wheeling policy-making,
Professor (now Judge) Monaghan posits the following insight:
One cannot read the works of Professors Tribe, Karst, Michelman, and a whole
host of others[s] ... without a profound feeling that.. for them the constitution
is essentially perfect in one central respect: properly construed, the constitution
guarantees the ... most equality and autonomy ... which the commentators
think a twentieth century Western liberal democratic government ought to guar-
antee to its citizens .... [Thus], each [of these] commentators can be fairly
described as "perfectionist."6 2
Professor Monaghan further explained that these perfectionists
are fellows-travelers with "[o]ther commentators [who] rely more
explicitly on insights derived from currently fashionable philosophic
or economic concepts to generate both common law and constitu-
tional principles. '1 63 He continued:
Application of common law approaches to ... constitutional law ... has im-
portant consequences for interpretation. First, it invites the extraction of quite
general political principles from specific constitutional guarantees. Second, and
more important, the common law method encourages the elaboration of supple-
mental, nontextually grounded principles of political morality to fill in any gaps
[in the face of Congress' and the States' failure to do so] ....
The common law approach [of an expansive body of law applied to con-
stitutional law] is particularly congenial to professors of law .... The tedious
labor associated with the historical search for original intent is eliminated ....
Armed with the insight of current social, political, and economic thinking, these
commentators can 'reason' about contemporary [constitutional] needs in the same
way that they would about tort problems .... [so that] constitutional values
themselves become [merely] one set of interests ... to be weighed against com-
peting social values.'"
Bank, 653 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A court is [not] free to ignore legal doctrine in order
to [serve] ... policy. If the law operated that way, there would be no need for ... legal principles.");
Rairigh v. Eribeck, 488 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D. Md. 1980) ("The persuasiveness of legal analysis does
not depend on the number of cases."); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 628, 351 N.E.2d 526, 531
(1976) ("[Tlhe mere longevity of [a] rule does not by itself provide cause for us to stay our hand if
to perpetuate the rule would ... perpetuate inequity,").
162. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 353, 358 (1981).
163. Id. at 391.
164. Id. at 391-92. See also John M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial
Function in Balance, 49 A.B.A. J. 943, 945 (1963):
Much of the useful criticism of judicial decisions ... now comes from the law schools. I
believe it would be of great value were their output .,. supplemented on an organized
basis by bar critiques ... bringing to bear the points of view of active practitioners on
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At this point, it may be well to recall the important historic role
economic liberty held before and during our nation's first century.
Undoubtedly, the framers were concerned about the confiscatory
tendency of all governments. 65 In 1886, the Supreme Court, quoting
James Madison, noted that "[tihe great end for which men entered
S.. society was to secure their property."' 66 Justice William Pat-
terson, a leading framer, stated that a primary objective of the social
compact must be the preservation of property because property will
not be inviolable if the legislature is vested with the dangerously
enormous power to take land from one citizen and give it to an-
other.1 67
In 1829, speaking for the Court, Justice Story said: "The fun-
damental maxims of a free government , . . require, that the rights
of ... property ... be held sacred. ' 168 Furthermore, history is re-
plete with evidence showing the fundamental nature of economic
liberty. However, one need not look back any further than 1972 for
such evidence when the Supreme Court noted that: "[T]he dichot-
omy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one
.... [A] fundamental interdependence exists between [the two, and
n]either could have meaning without the other. That [property] rights
important cases.
See also Glazer, Marxism and the Law School. A Nonlegal Perspective, 8 HAhv. J,L. & PUB. POL'Y
249 (1985); and Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HAhv. L. REv.
1436, 1455 (1987) (noting that courts are losing the characteristics that separate them from the leg-
islature through their approach to "public interest" litigation with the result that "[w]hen judges
come to view litigants mostly as trimmings for their rulings, the sense of individual worth ... that
differentiates our culture from some others may diminish."). Absent an unwillingness to return to
common sense, we will continue drifting toward "an irreconcilable adversarial culture ... [that is]
morally reprehensible and materially impoverishing." Beckwith, What Should Lawyers Do?, supra
note 20, at 26.
165. See generally M. FARRAND, Tim REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENToN OF 1787 (1911).
Some may object that the approach urged here is too "literalist." Please note Justice Holmes' warning
that "[tihere is a strong presumption that the literal meaning [of a law] is the true one." United
States v. M. H. Pulaski Co., 243 U.S. 97, 106 (1917). However, here it is just not the language of
the Constitution that is being interpreted but the application of a fairly abundant historical record,
including clear decisions by the Supreme Court soon after the Constitutional Convention. In this
context, the ephitet "literalist" seems little more than a guise behind which to hide one's dislike of
an historically-based jurisprudence.
166. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886).
167. Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 310-12.
168. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829).
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• ..are basic civil rights has long been recognized. ' 169 The Supreme
Court has elsewhere noted the importance of economic liberties in
the context of the "little guy's" ownership of property.
170
It may be asked whether a valid distinction exists between a
wealthy citizen's property and a "little guy's" property. If such a
distinction is valid, how is it to be defined in a consistently principled
way? Given the effect of investors' decisions on the production of
jobs and expansion of the economy, harming a wealthy property
owner would surely injure the "little guy" as well. If we allowed
individuals to have preferred rights in consumer goods commonly
held by the "little guy" while strictly regulating and thereby dis-
couraging development and production of new goods, services, and
jobs by stifling and disparaging entrepreneurship, the right to own
and enjoy increasingly costly, rare, and lackluster goods would in-
deed be no bargain. Ranking freedoms is a tricky, if not presump-
tious, business, indeed.
In 1976, the Supreme Court stated:
The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities ....
[And] if the authors of those guarantees ... were unwilling or unable to ...
assignHl to one [right] priority over the other, it is not for us to rewrite the
Constitution by undertaking what they declined to do.'
7 '
In 1982, the Court reiterated this point by noting that there is "no
principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional
values on a complementary [sic] sliding scale .... ,,7
A right or guarantee is fundamental if it is "explicitly or im-
plicitly guaranteed by the Constitution," not by its perceived relative
169. Lynch v. Household Finance, 405 U.S. 538, 547-48 (1972). The Court further noted that
"the line between [personal freedoms and economic liberties] has been difficult to draw with any
consistency or principled objectivity." Id. at 551.
170. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972) ("IT]he Fourteenth Amendment draws no
bright lines around three day, 10-day or 50-day deprivations of property."); Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969) ("[A] prejudgment garnishment ... may as a practical
matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall.").
171. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976).
172. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982). See also Ullman v. Poe, 350 U.S. 422, 480 (1956) ("[Als no constitutional
guarantee enjoys preference, so none should suffer subordination .... ).
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shifting societal importance. 7  A contrary rule would inevitably re-
sult in particular guarantees being placed on a constitutional roller-
coaster with courts periodically decreeing that social conditions no
longer warranted terming one right "fundamental" while those same
changed conditions justified catapulting a theretofore "ordinary"
freedom to exalted "fundamental" status. A return to first principles
would be soundly in keeping with the Supreme Court's apt obser-
vation in 1914 that "[1]ife, liberty, property, and the equal protection
of the law, grouped together in the Constitution, are so related that
the deprivation of any . .. may lessen or extinguish the value of
the other[s] ".... 174 Undoubtedly, such a return to basic principles
would involve adjustment, but "[i]f the provisions of the Consti-
tution may not be upheld when they pinch as well as when they
comfort, they may as well be abandoned.' 175 After all, "the validity
of a [constitutional guarantee] does not depend on whose ox it
gores.' '176
A return to first principles will likely involve the judiciary's col-
lective resolve to adopt a proper attitude of "[h]umility ... an alert
self-scrutiny so as to avoid infusing into the vagueness of a con-
stitutional command one's merely private [if allegedly popular] no-
tions." 177 As with the supposed abandonment of economic substantive
due process, this includes a realization that while the judiciary "is
forever adding new stories to the temple of constitutional law, ...
the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is
added.' ' 78 Above all, the courts "must be deaf to all suggestions
that a valid appeal to the Constitution ... comes too late, because
courts ... were not earlier able [or willing] to enforce what the
Constitution demands."' 1
79
173. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). See also Lee, Preserving
Separation of Powers: A Rejection of Judicial Legislation Through the Fundamental Rights Doctrine,
25 ARiz. L. REv. 805 (1983).
174. Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636 (1914) (Holmes, J., for the Court).
175. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 483 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
176. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 525 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
177. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 602 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
178. Douglas v. Jeannett, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
179. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 165 (1957).
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As applied to economic substantive due process, this means, as
Justice Holmes said, that "the most enlightened judicial policy is
to let people manage their own business in their own way ...,0
and that liberty may be nothing more than "doing what you want
to do" within the limits of a self-governing republic. 181
Standard of Review
What standard or scope of review should courts apply to gov-
ernment regulation of economic liberties? Should special provisions
be made for experimental laws and, if so, when should the exper-
iment be deemed to be complete so that judicial review may begin
in earnest? Taking the second question first, the Supreme Court in
1932 overturned an Oklahoma statute that had the effect of pro-
hibiting the entry into the marketplace of new ice manufacturers (in
a day when electric refrigerators were considered to be luxuries),
ruling that "unreasonable or arbitrary interferences or restrictions
cannot be saved . . .merely by calling them experimental."1 2 Oth-
erwise, one is faced with a never-ending conundrum in which the
experiment is, like some moot issues, ever-recurring but constantly
evading meaningful judicial review. That is the case when a legis-
lature fails to insert a sunset clause in such laws which serves to
automatically terminate the experiment at the end of a prescribed
time period. Sunset clauses should permit rigorous judicial review
of burdensome economic regulation. Whether or not re-enacted, a
sunset clause in such laws tacitly declares that the time deemed nec-
essary for a particular experiment to prove worth-while has ended.
As to the first question, the standard of judicial review obviously
should be the same for both personal freedoms and economic lib-
erties. Personal and economic liberties are both part of one Bill of
Rights involving a single "constitutional legality.., indivisible...
[in which] the right to wound one part of the body ... is the right
to destroy the life.' ' 83 Aghast as some might be at the thought of
180. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
181. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
182. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 279 (1932).
183. BLACK, Tam PEOPLE AND THE COURT 190 (1960).
[Vol. 92
44
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss1/7
ECONOMIC LIBERTY
scrapping the "compelling government interest" standard of review,
there is little, if any, solid historic support for it. As Justice Black
stated in 1965:
The Due Process Clause with an 'arbitrary and capricious' or 'shocking to the
conscience' formula was liberally used by this court to strike down economic
legislation .... That formula, based on subjective considerations of 'natural
justice,' is no less dangerous when used to enforce this Court's views about per-
sonal rights than those about economic rights.18
4
Justice Rhenquist echoed that concern in 1972:
[I]n the field of economic and social legislation, the Court has given great
latitude to the legislatures .... However, this salutary principle has been departed
from by the Court in recent years . . . where the Court has felt that the clas-
sification has affected what it conceives to be 'fundamental personal rights.'
The difficulty with the approach, devoid as it is of any historic or textual
support . . . , is that it leaves . . . to the Justices of this Court the determination
of what are, and what are not, 'fundamental personal rights.' Those who framed
and ratified the Constitution and the ... amendments to it chose to select certain
... rights and freedoms, and to guarantee them against impairment .... While
the determination of the extent to which a right is protected may result in ...
drawing ... fine lines, the fundamental sanction of the right itself is found in
the language of the Constitution, and not elsewhere. The same is unfortunately
not true of 'the doctrine of fundamental personal rights.' This body of doctrine
created by the Court can only be described as a judicial superstructure, awkwardly
engrafted upon the Constitution itself.
[H]ow is the Court to know when it is dealing with a 'fundamental personal
right'?
While the Court's opinion today is by no means a sharp departure from the
[recent] precedents on which it relies, it is an extraordinary departure from ...
the intent of the framers . . . and the import of the traditional presumption of
constitutionality accorded to legislative enactments. Nowhere in the text of the
Constitution, or in its plain implications, is there any guide for determining what
is ... a 'fundamental personal right.""'
In this same vein, Learned Hand noted that "[t]here is no con-
stitutional basis for asserting a larger measure of judicial supervi-
184. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). See also Cox,
The New Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication, WAsH. L. REv. 791, 797-98 (1976).
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sion" over personal freedoms than economic liberties. 18 6 Likewise,
one commentator has stated:
As several of the Justices have noted in dissent, there is only a verbal difference
between the 'fundamental rights' branch of the [compelling] government [interest]
test and the now discredited [substantive] due process of such cases as Lochner
v. New York. Both of them leave the Court entirely at large, with full freedom
to enact its own natural law conclusions. The only difference is ... that type
of interest . . . protected.1 17
Justice William 0. Douglas recognized that economic liberties and
personal freedoms should not be treated differently and argued that
judicial review in both areas use the strict scrutiny standard.'88
The practical effect of either scrapping the "compelling govern-
ment interest" standard or applying it uniformly to economic lib-
erties would be considerable. "A justification by 'compelling
government interest' is a burden which has been sustained only once
186. HD, THE BiLL oF RionTs 50-51 (1962). See also Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 SrA L. REv. 140, 167 (1949) ("If substantive due process
is a natural-law gloss in the economic field, it is just as much so in the field of civil liberties. There
is no basis for rejecting the doctrine in one case and adopting it in the other except the subjective
preferences or convictions of the individual judge."). Professor Tribe has noted that:
Apart from its analytic weakness, the distinction between economic and non-economic rights
overlooks the importance of property and contract in protecting the dispossessed no less
than the established ... and in no event could it justify more than the most modest dif-
ference in degree between the judicial roles [or standard of review] in the two areas.
L. TRmE, supra note 19, at 949 (citing Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-72 (1964);
McCloskey, Economid Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup.
CT. REv. 34, 51). Compare this with Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 207 (1976) ("[E]conomic matters
... merit only the mildest review under the Fourteenth Amendment. .. ."); United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1977) (economic regulation does not violate due process "unless
the consequences are particularly 'harsh and oppressive' "). While still a member of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, Justice Holmes noted that "[ftree competition is worth more to society than
it costs .... ." Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
187. L. LusKY, By WHAT RiaT?, 266 (1975). This development was foreseen by Justice Holmes
in Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the ever increasing
scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down what I believe to be the con-
stitutional rights of the States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the
sky to ... invalidating ... these rights if they happen to strike a majority of the Court
as for any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the Amendment was intended to give
us carte blanche [power] to embody our social and economic belief in its prohibitions ....
[W]e should be slow to construe ... the Fourteenth Amendment as committing to the
Court ... no guide but the Court's own discretion ....
188. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 82 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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in the annals of civil rights litigation."'1 89 But the same standard
should apply to both "branches" of the Bill of Rights, regardless
which is chosen, since they are co-equal under the Constitution.
VIII. IDEAS ABOUT EcONoMIc LIBERTIES HAVE CONSEQUENCES
Ideas do not exist in a vacuum. They clearly and directly affect
our lives and legal system. After all, "[lI]aw is nothing else than
reason.' 19° Justice Frankfurter noted that "[l]aw isn't something that
exists in a closed system within itself, but draws its juices from
life."' 9' And as Justice Holmes explained, "[tihe law is the witness
and external deposit of our moral life.
'192
Too often economic liberties have been regarded as matters of
interest to the rich only. Yet economic liberties are just as important
for those who aspire to achieve wealth, regardless how comfortable
or desperate they may be. As Professor Siegan said:
For a great many in our society, the opportunity to engage freely in a busi-
ness, trade, occupation or profession is the most important liberty society has to
offer.
[In that and other ways] the Constitution speaks to the general political con-
dition that has changed little if at all since the eighteenth century. The Framers'
... concerns are as pressing today as they were two hundred years ago.
[T]he Court should protect the liberties necessary to maintain the form of
government [originally] created. [I]n the economic sphere, the Framers sought to
perpetuate a system based on property and private enterprise.
Although many jurists complain about substantive due process in the eco-
nomic sphere, they have not been reluctant to accept the course pursued ... in
. recogniz[ing]-some would say creat[ing]-a privacy right entitled to sub-
stantive protection [under the 'penumbra' theory]. This suggests that such criticism
relates to the ends and not the means ... in order to accomplish ... social and
economic goals-the identical objective ascribed to the Court of the 'discredited'
189. Sloan, Changing Shape of Land Use Litigation: Federal Court Challenges to Exclusionary
Land Use Practices, 51 NomR, DAMB LAWYER 48, 68 n.117 (1975) (citing Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
190. Lester v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 240 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir. 1957).
191. FRANKFURTER, FEux FRANKFURTER REMEmiERS 168 (1960).
192. 0. W. Housms, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGA PAERs 170 (1920). The "law"
is an empty shell into which society pours its values. Standing alone and apart from that moral
anchor, the "law" is susceptible of being manipulated in quite nasty ways. See also R. NEuHAus,
THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 152 (1986 ed.) ("The law is a friendly fellow, amenable to our wishes,
plastic in the hands of the powerful.").
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substantive due process period .... Omission of a protection 1s not less defective
or arbitrary than its exaggeration ....
Constitutional freedom was seen [by its detractors] as a cover under which
the ambitions of [the rich] could be nourished .... [Yet] [e]conomic due process
usually favored economic competition-a state of affairs not always pleasing to
big business [especially when upstart small businesses erode their market by cheaper
and better products] . . . . In general, the Supreme Court's present abdication
with respect to socioeconomic legislation [a.huge portion of any legislature's out-
put] has been more beneficial to the rich than ... the poor. 93
Furthermore, there clearly exists a strong tendency for the "little
guy" to get squeezed out of lucrative government business contracts,
especially in large cities with a one-party political system. In this
regard, the highly-regulated economies in Boston or Berkeley are as
subject to abuse as those in Moscow or East Germany. Moreover,
business regulation often has the (perhaps unintended) consequence
of reducing jobs or increasing consumer prices or both, which are
matters of vital importance to the "little guy." In reviewing Muller
v. Oregon,194 in which the Supreme Court upheld the validity of an
Oregon statute limiting women laundry workers to 10-hour work
days, Judge Posner concluded that the employer in that case was
permitted to: (1) reduce the women's pay to reflect the shorter hours,
(2) hire fewer new workers or lay-off some workers if constrained
by minimum wage laws, and/or (3) raise his prices. 95 Any of those
alternatives would hurt the "little guy" worker and consumer.
The callous and inhumane Marxist retort that "one must break
some eggs in order to make an omelet" fails miserably to address
these economic dynamics and is nothing more than tacit agreement
193. SmoAx, supra note 133, at 4, 12, 15, 20. While many of the ideas expressed herein may
seem to ring of moral values and concepts, the reader is reminded that:
The socialists have been successful largely because they have argued in moral terms, Un-
willingness to learn from experience any lessons as to the actual practice of socialism, many
socialists rely on the superficial attraction of a pleasing moral vision to which many, es-
pecially intellectuals, readily aspire. This morally attractive aspiration gives the socialists
much of their power, and once their program has been implemented and the terrible truth
of socialist practice becomes known, the drift to a redistributive subsistence economy and
the collapse of democracy may become irreversible.
Beckwith, supra note 21, at 25. All legal systems are based on moral or philosophical assumptions.
See LEvinsoN, The Law School, the Faith Community, and the Profession of Law in CONsTrIoNAL
FArrH 8 (1988); Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STANFORD L. Rav. 1 (1984).
194. 208 U.S. 412, 420-22 (1908).
195. R. PosNER, ECONomc ANALYsis OF LAw § 25.1 (1977).
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that under Marxism, the individual has little or no worth. 196 After
several decades of communism tempered with vast amounts of west-
ern assistance, Marxist nations today not only lack enough "omelet"
to feed all the hungry mouths but also have stopped producing eggs
altogether. As a result, those Marxist nations reluctantly are begin-
ning to accept desperately-needed free market principles.
The philosophical inconsistencies, resulting from the judiciary's
diverse treatment of personal freedoms as opposed to economic lib-
erties along with its self-professed ineptitude in dealing with eco-
nomic matters, seem all the more indefensible, given the judiciary's
willingness to order massive institutional relief on public budgets
and treasuries in a variety of civil rights cases. 197 The "judicial power
of the purse"1 98 has been with us for some time, despite self-ex-
culpatory statements to the contrary by some jurists. Economic reg-
ulation should be no more of a mystery to the judiciary than are
taxation, offender rehabilitation, criminal insanity, marital irrec-
oncilable differences, and lost future-earnings. The mere existence
of legal periodicals such as The Business Lawyer and Journal of
Law and Economics clearly attest to the fact that the legal profession
is well acquainted with the nuances of economics and with its im-
portance to human liberty and law.
196. As Justice Jackson noted,
[Communism's] whole philosophy is to minimize man as an individual .... If any single
characteristic distinguishes democracy from Communism it is our recognition of the indi-
vidual as a personality rather than as a soulless part in the jigsaw puzzle that is the collectivist
state.
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 443 (1950).
197. See Turpin v. Mallet, 579 F.2d 152, 165 n.38 (2nd Cir. 1978) (listing instances in which
Supreme Court ordered relief which "placed significant fiscal burdens on governmental entities"),
vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 974 (1979); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Lit-
igation, 89 HAv L. Rav. 1281, 1284 (1976) ("[T]he trial judge has increasingly become the creator
and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief, which ... require the judge's continuing involvement
in administration and implementation.").
198. See Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. Rv. 715, 794 (1978). According
to Judge Frank M. Coffin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, "the judge must play
not only an adjudicative, but legislative and executives roles as well." Coffin, The Frontier of Rem-
edies: A Call for Exploration, 67 CALm. L. Rav. 983, 989 (1979). "These forms of relief raise the
question whether the judiciary has begun to tolerate in itself a blending of functions that would never
be tolerated in another branch of government". Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal
Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN L. REV. 661, 661 (1978).
1989]
49
Houle: Eminent Domain, Police Power, and Business Regulation: Economic L
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
As noted earlier, the courts have held that eminent domain and
business regulation may be evaluated by a standardless ad hoc case-
by-case method. Given the inherent nature of such a system, near
absolute discretion is placed in trial judges or hearings examiners,
especially given the individual's demanding burden of proof on ap-
peal. Yet, use of such a standardless system is thought of by many
as normal despite the fact that an ad hoc system stunts, or precludes,
future development of a consistently principled jurisprudence. This
is true, given the fact that in an ad hoc system, the possibility that
meaningful principles can exist is rejected at the outset.
One eminent economist, August von Hayek, has spoken of the
need to adhere to fixed principles and to prohibit unprincipled ad
hoc decisions:
It has come to be regarded as the sign of the judicious mind that in social matters
one does not adhere to fixed principles but decides each question 'on its merits;'
that one is generally guided by expediency and is ready to compromise between
opposed views .... The pragmatic [expedient] attitude ... far from increasing
our command over developments, has in fact led us to a state of affairs which
nobody wanted [in which unprincipled standardlessness is a way of life].
It is a serious confusion thus to speak of principle when all that is meant
is that no principle but only expediency should rule .... If the choice between
freedom and coercion is ... treated as a matter of expediency, freedom is bound
to be sacrificed in almost every instance ....
The idea that we are not fully free to pick and choose whatever combination
of factors we wish our society to possess, or to fit them together in a viable
whole ... that we cannot build desirable social order like a mosaic ... and that
many well-intentioned measures may have a long train of unforeseeable and un-
desirable consequences, seems to be intolerable to modern man. 199
Likewise, renowned philosopher C. S. Lewis explained that only
in relatively recent times has mankind begun to doubt that its value
judgments are rational and objective. 20° It is the modern view that
value judgments are really not judgments at all but, instead, are
nothing more than sentiments, complexes, or attitudes, which are
produced by pressures of the environment and tradition and which
199. THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK, 131-32, 143, 144, 301-04 (Nishiyama & Leube ed. 1984).
200. C. S. LEwis, CimusmT REcioNs 73 (1967).
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differ among the various communities. 201 He then states the follow-
ing:
[Tihe fatal superstition [is] that men can create values, that a community can
choose its 'ideology' as men choose their clothes. Everyone is indignant when he
hears the [Nazi] Germans define justice as that which is to the interest of the
Third Reich. But it is not always remembered that this indignation is perfectly
groundless if we ourselves regard morality as a subjective sentiment to be altered
at will .... If 'good' and 'better' are terms deriving their sole meaning from
the ideology of each people, then of course ideologies themselves cannot be better
or worse than one another. Unless the measuring rod is independent of the things
measured, we can do no measuring .... [and] progress and decadence are ...
meaningless words.-
Going one step further, modern humanity's allegedly chronic alien-
ation is due not to an intrinsic flaw in the free market or in com-
petition but rather to the tension created by comparing the limitations
of this life with the inhumane standards of a utopian existence which
collectivists vehemently assert can and will be achieved on earth.
Faced with the utopian claim that humanity can and must achieve
those unreachable heights, many mortals succumb to the belief that
heaven is obtainable on earth and to the feeling of alienation that
ensues. Thus, as disillusioned individuals begin striving to achieve
the unrealistic utopian premise rather than accepting humanity's lim-
ited capacity for perfection and a limited democratic system of gov-
201. Id.
202. Id. Author Ayn Rand has explained the impracticality of being too practical:
A major symptom of a man's-or a culture's-intellectual and moral disintegration
is the shrinking of vision and goals to the concrete bound range of the immediate moment
... [or] the inability to think and act in terms of principles ....
The present state of our culture may be gauged by the extent to which principles have
vanished from public discussion, reducing our cultural atmosphere to ... betraying all its
major values, selling out its future for some spurious advantage of the moment ....
But there is nothing as impractical as [the] so-called 'practical' man. His view of
practicality can best be illustrated as follows: if you want to drive from New York to Los
Angeles, it is 'impractical' and 'idealistic' to consult a map and select the best way to get
there; you will get there much faster if you just start out driving at random, turning (or
cutting) any comer, taking ... [the nearest] road in any [convenient] direction, following
nothing but the mood and the weather of the moment ....
[Mien have been emerging from universities, for many decades past, with the help-
lessness of epistemological savages, with no inkling of the nature, function, or practical
application of [unvarying] principles.
A. RAND, CAPr. AisM: Tan UmNowN IDEAL 144-45 (1967).
19891
51
Houle: Eminent Domain, Police Power, and Business Regulation: Economic L
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW [Vol, 92
ernment needed to deal with that reality while maximizing personal
freedom, those individuals begin to blame modern western civili-
zation for any and all obstacles standing in the way of paradise.
In noting that governmental intervention into the operations of
a more-or-less free market discourages resourcefulness or fairness
and encourages government, rather than the objective operation of
the market, to decide who profits or loses, Professor Hayek de-
scribed this shifting of authority (from the operation of the market
to government) as a vain attempt at avoiding the inevitable con-
sequences of market imbalances:
[I]n the case of complex spontaneous orders [of a free market] we will never be
able to determine more than the general principles on which they operate ....
This ignorance of how the mechanism of ... [a free market] will solve ... [the]
'problem' ... often produces panic-like alarm and the demand for [the] gov-
ernment ... [to] restorfel ... the disturbed [previously unstable] balance ....
The necessity of adaptation to unforeseen events will always mean that someone
is going to be hurt... [by market 'corrections']. This leads to the demand that
the ... adjustment be brought about by deliberate guidance, which in practice
.. mean[s] that ... [government] is to decide who is to be hurt. The effect
.. is often that the necessary adjustments will be prevented whenever . . . fore-
seen [while the imbalance worsens and the eventual 'correction' is made pro-
portionately (if not geometrically) even worse]."'
Professor Hayek concluded that a free market did not mandate
that human nature must first become better than it is to make the
economy work properly and that true morality is a matter of free
203. THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK, supra note 199, at 307-08. Before becoming Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, David Stockman had the following insight on the futility of "planned"
economies:
The essential impulse of the planner is to pierce and dispel the veil of uncertainly that
hangs over society's long-term future by extrapolating resource supply-and-demand trends,
and then to impose regulations, management schemes, and other trend-altering constraints
on current patterns of production and use in order to insure balance for the indefinite
future.
What planners everywhere fail to recognize, however, is that future uncertainty is an
inherent corollary of the basic impulse that propels economic life, whether under market-
price systems centralized state-directed systems, or the array of variants in between. That
impulse is the universal striving of men and societies to increase wealth and living standards
by getting more for less-more output or utility for less resource input.
Stockman, How the Market Outwits the Planners, DoEs Bio BusiNEss RuLE Am EICA? 63 (R. Hessen
ed. 1982).
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will, not government coercion in the form of imposing a just ec-
onomic order on others, however well-meaning the imposition. In
short, the free market does not require that an elite run things in-
definitely until the rest of us are sufficiently enlightened to assume
full adult responsibilities and rights. That patronizing view of hu-
manity disturbed Hayek as it manifested itself in two important ways
that are hallmarks of totalitarian systems: first, the belief held by
many that the state must coerce individuals into deciding to share
their wealth with others, and second, the belief held by certain groups
that they were anointed with the power to direct life until humanity
eventually becomes better able to safely share that power.204 Hayek
noted:
[The free market] system, .. does not depend.., on our finding good men for
running it, or on all men becoming better than they now are .... [A free market]
grant[s] freedom to all, instead of restricting it ... to 'the good and the wise.'
To the ... [Judeo-] Christian tradition ... man must be free to follow his
[individual] conscience in moral matters [rather than be coerced by law] if his
actions are to be of any [moral] merit . . ,
To this might be added the observation of Aldous Huxley in Brave
New World06 that while humanity has ever-increasingly progressed
technologically, it has not collectively advanced morally whatsoever.
If this were true, we- would surely have a long wait under com-
munism for the masses to "mature" to the point of true self-gov-
ernment, a wait at least equal to that of the Second Coming itself.
204. THE ESSENCE OF HAWK, supra note 199, at 137-38,
205. Id. at 137-38, 139-40. Like it or not, law has profound roots in traditional moral concepts.
See 52A C,J,S. Law nn.95-99 (1968). Frederic Bastiat, the nineteenth century French philosopher,
noted:
[Tjhe statement [that] the purpose of the law is to cause justice to reign is not a ...
[strictly] accurate statement, It ought to be stated that the prupose of the law is to prevent
injustice from reigning .... Justice is achieved only when injustice is absent.
But when the law, by means of its necessary agent, force, imposes upon men, . . regulation
of, .. [matters previously left to the individual] then the law is no longer [acting] nega-
tive[ly] ... [to prevent injustice but instead] acts positively upon people [by mandating the
moral values implicit in the new law enforced],
F, BAsuAT, Tiu LAw 29 (1984). Furthermore, Bastiat explained that "[allthough mankind is not [and
never will be] perfect, ... all hope rests upon the free and voluntary actions of persons within the
limits of [injustice] ... ." Id. at 73.
206. A. HuxLEY, BRAvB Naw WORLD (1950),
1989]
53
Houle: Eminent Domain, Police Power, and Business Regulation: Economic L
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
Justice Holmes' statement that "the most enlightened judicial
policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way
•.. . 207 applies with equal force to the type of government inter-
vention in the free market that Hayek condemned. In this connec-
tion, as noted earlier, we should "remember[] always that generosity
is not a virtue when dealing with the property of others. ' 208 Those
who are indifferent to governmental infringement of economic lib-
erties would likely protest most vehemently the government's in-
fringement of personal freedoms by restricting abortion and
reinstituting prayer in the public school system.
Traditional lore has it that "good" kings and queens, republics
and public officials give large sums of money to the poor. They are
called "compassionate" while those not similarly inclined are called
"heartless" and "insensitive." However, no mention is made of how
such philanthropists came by their largess. This tradition is, of course,
fantasy because government is not a philanthropic institution. In-
stead, it is an organization that routinely employs public force and
coercion against those who resist its commands. 20 9 If you refuse to
207. Doctor Miles Medical Co., 220 U.S. at 411.
208. Cashion v. Western Union Telegraph, Co., 123 N.C. 267, 273, 31 S.E. 493, 494 (1898).
209. Similarily, Michael Novak, a commentator on religion and the free market, noted the trend
in both fact and fiction to dramatize "distributive justice" at the expense of an obligation to produce
wealth:
In pre-modern literature, most treatises on justice have a great deal to say about dis-
tributive justice, but it had not entered ... the mind of man to imagine that he had an
obligation to produce, to create wealth ....
... [But by about the start of the industrial age,] [t]here was a productive ethic. The
world of the year 1800 had 800 million should in it, most of whose lives were nasty, brutish,
and short. Famines racked London or Paris every fifteen or twenty years, killing as many
as ten thousand people; the average life expectancy in France in 1800 was twenty-seven for
females and twenty-four for males. Those who could produce more food, shelter, and
clothing ... were suddenly acquiring an obligation to do so. Justice now imposed an ob-
ligation upon those who could produce .... [Therefore,] Justice, ... has a productive as
well as a distributive dimension, and the first is a precondition of the second.
Novak, The Moral-Religious Basis of Democratic Capitalism, CmsRTANIY AN PoLrIcs: CATHoLIc
aND PROTESTANT PERSPECTrIVEs 60-61 (C. Griffith ed. 1981) (emphasis added).
Some might be inclined to say that a "duty to produce" applied to situations where humanity
was facing starvation only, not to modern times where "luxuries" or non-necessities are produced.
Any such "minimalist" view ignores the fact that as humanity strives to achieve a physical and spiritual
standard above and beyond the level of stark necessity, its needs will correspondingly grow and expand.
For example, while petroleum is not an absolute physical necessity, its sudden disappearance would
quickly produce death and famine as cities became shut off from food transportation and as buildings
[Vol. 92
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part with that portion of your funds on which government lays
claim, you go to jail or face the executioner.
Yet the legal profession serves as an unwitting accomplice in the
process of incorporating heretofore inimical concepts into law. Pro-
fessor Hayek added:
In spite of the collapse of. ... totalitarian regimes . . . [or near collapse averted
only by western aid], their basic [values] ... continueH to gain ground, so much
so that to transform completely the legal system into a totalitarian one all that
is needed now is to allow the ideas already reigning in the abstract sphere to be
[put] into practice.
[W]hen a general philosophy of the law which is not in accord with the greater
part of the existing law has recently gained ascendancy .... the same lawyer
will, through ... habits and techniques, and generally ... unwittingly, become
a revolutionary force, as effective in ... transforming the law down to every
detail as [he or she was] before in preserving it.
In other words, law . . . [will] not ... consist of abstract [unvarying] rules which
make possible the formation of a spontaneous order by the free action of in-
dividuals through limiting the range of their action, but is to be the instrument
of [manipulative] arrangement ... by which the individual is made to serve [gov-
ernment's] purpose.
2 10
Noting the Frankenstein-like character of such trends, he added that
"sources of many of the most harmful agents in this world are often
and homes became uninhabitably cold. Further, such a "minimalist" view makes the fatal mistake
of attempting to throttle or isolate "physical" man while allegedly encouraging the growth of "spir-
itual" man, forgetting their unity. In sum, the argument for the "horse-and-buggy" body and the
"space-age" mind is both ludicrous and tragically short-sighted. As the early twentieth century thinker
Ludwig von Mises noted:
To form a correct conception of the social significance of luxury consumption, one
must first of all realize that the concept ... is an altogether relative one [which is essentially
historical]. Many things that seem to us necessities today were once considered as luxuries
.... This is the course of economic history. The luxury of today is the necessity of to-
morrow .... Luxury consumption provides industry with the Stimulus to discover and
introduce new things.
[Even] the rich idler .... fulfills function in .. . life .... [by] awaken[ing] in the
multitude a consciousness of new needs and gives industry the incentive to fulfill them.
L. Misas, LiBERA.isM N THE CiAssIcAL TRADITION 32-22 (3d ed. 1985).
210. Tim EssENCE oF HAYICK, supra note 199, at 310-11, 315-16. Elsewhere, Professor Hayek
noted that "[o]utside the sphere of individual responsibility there is ... no[] ... chance of proving
one's conviction by sacrificing one's desires to what one thinks right. Only where we ourselves are
responsible for our own interests and are free to sacrifice them has our decision moral value." A.
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SEaDoM 211 (1944).
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not evil men but high-minded idealists ... [I]n particular the foun-
dations of totalitarian barbarism have been laid by honourable and
well-meaning scholars who never recognized the offspring they pro-
duced." 211
Former U.N. Ambassador Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick summed up the
distinction between mere dictatorships (usually those on the political
far right), which usually develop into more democratic societies and
are not usually bent on transforming the total man but only on
maintaining personal power, and totalitarian regimes (usually Marx-
ist), which tend to remain permanently and to control the totality
of one's existence (hence the adjective "totalitarian"):
A totalitarian regime is distinguished by its rulers' determination to transform
society, culture, and personality through the use of coercive state power, Non-
totalitarian systems whether autocracies or democracies do not use power for such
broad purposes. The distinguishing characteristic of totalitarian goals is that they
dramatically extend the scope of government activity ... expand[ing] the scope
of coercion in a society.
Totalitarian governments are those whose rulers see the whole of the society,
economy, culture, and personality as appropriate fields for government regulation.
What one reads, writes, studies, [wears], publishes, works at, where one lives and
works, what one is paid, and by whom are all thought to be the business of
government ... [Totalitarian is utopianism to come to power.
[T]otalitarian[ism] . . . emphasizes the identity of individual ... [for] col-
lective purposes, [so that] the ... moral perfection of men is ... inextricably
... made dependent on the perfection of society.212
The nature of totalitarian systems is hardly new and cannot be pre-
sumed to have been beyond the ken of the framers. As noted scholar
Robert Nisbet summed up:
211. THE EssENcE o HAYCK, supra note 199, at 314.
212. J. KuucPATRicK, DICTATORSHIPS AND DoumBa STANDARDs 99, 101, 102, 310-11, 315 (1982).
This debate is hardly new. As Dr. Kirkpatrick notes:
Plato believed that an individual's moral quality derived from his membership in a just
society in which everyone accepted his assigned station and duties and voluntarily and con-
sistently subordinated personal to collective goals. Aristotle argued that his teacher over-
estimated human malleability [and perfectibility] and underestimated the tenacity of organic
ties and human wickedness. Aristotle also argued that experience and law were better guides
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There have been two great traditions in Western social and political thought,
and these have little to do with conventional distinctions between 'liberal' and
'absolutist.' In the first, which begins with Plato, the political state is given an
emphasis that virtually extinguishes other forms of private association. Hobbes,
Rousseau, Bentham, Michlet, Fichte, Treitschke are among . . . [those] in this
tradition ....
The second tradition is far more interesting and . . . valuable . . . . This
tradition begins... with Aristotle ... and includes ... Cicero, Thomas Aquinas,
Bodin, Althusius, Burke, Tocqueville, Proudhon .... Basic to this tradition is
the clear distinction between social institutions and the political state .... A
political government may be nominally democratic or republican, but it cannot
be a genuinely free government if the powers of the state have reached out to
encompass all spheres of social, moral, economic, and intellectual existence. Con-
versely, a government monarchical or oligarchical in structure can be a free gov-
ernment if ... it respects the other institutions of society and permits autonomies
... in the [private] social and economic spheres. 2t 3
Because this has been forgotten or ignored, Nisbet claimed, the value
attributed to the public sector has far eclipsed that attributed to
individual initiative. 214 As a result, an individual's immoral or anti-
social behavior has escaped censure so long as that behavior provides
some kind of service to the public.215 In other words, "[t]o be ag-
gressive and rapacious in the name of one's family, job, or business
is by definition evil; but to be aggressive and rapacious in the name
... of HEW or [the] IRS . . . carries a different evaluation in the
mind of the political intellectual.' '216
Despite this glaring inconsistency, Kirkpatrick explains that the
reason for popular current intellectual disdain for western institu-
tions and values is "the intellectuals' habit of measuring institutions
and practices against abstract standards . . . [for whenever] society
is measured against an abstract [and unattainable] conception of a
just order, it will [always] be seen to have failed. ' 217 Thus, she
213. Nisbet, The Restoration of Authority, CONSERVA.IW READER 660-61 (R. Kirk ed. (1982)).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 668.
216. Id.
217. J. KmnUPATRiCK, supra note 212, at 194. She also noted that, "[lit is... easy to understand
why the New Class is more often liberal than conservative. The habit of measuring existing practices
against abstract principles inevitably leads to discontent with the status quo." Id. Until the mid-
1960's, she added, "reform proceeded in response to some concrete evil. Since then, more and more
reforms have been stimulated by the goals of reformers, rather than by the desires the affected groups
.... The difference is nothing less than ... [one] between democratic government and [a] revo-
lutionary dictatorship." Id. at 202.
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concludes, "[tihe political temptation of the new class lies in be-
lieving that its members' intelligence and exemplary motives equip
them to reorder the institutions, the lives and ... characters of
almost everyone."218
Perhaps, as Plato asserted, today's New Class utopians fervently
believe that a perfect society will exist when everyone has accepted
his or her station in life. Such a belief routinely subordinates the
individual to the collective goals of society and imposes a natural
elite who must assign to those less gifted their lot in life until such
time that society as a whole becomes "sufficiently enlightened." This
is, of course, nothing other than the collectivist or modern totali-
tarian claim that the individual is incapable of self-government and
must be ruled by higher authority until the ever-awaited golden era
somehow arrives. Of course, the New Class disdains inherited wealth
and privilege and seeks to level society in that regard. However, its
members fail to realize that individual merit in the form of innate
talent and intelligence is nothing more than a genetic, as opposed
to a financial, inheritance. Both forms of inheritances are the result
of nature's lottery rather than true individual effort.
Whatever the truth in that regard, the dynamics and vibrancy
of the free market render soulless regimented economies an anemic
spectacle in comparison. As Justice Benjamin Cardozo said, "[a free
market or economy] never stands still. It either grows or decays.) 219
After all, "[t]here is no such thing as achieved liberty; like electricity,
there can be no substantial storage [of liberty for later use] and it
must be generated as it is enjoyed, [or] the lights go out. ' 220 Thus,
an individual's personal disregard for "opportunistic and heartless
entrepreneurs" should not stand in the way of honoring economic
liberty. As noted by Justice Frankfurter, "[iut is a fair summary of
history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been
forged in controversies involving not very nice people." ' 22'
218. Id. at 203.
219. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935).
220. Jackson, The Task of Maintaining Our Liberties: The Role of the Judiciary. 39 A.B.A.
J. 961, 962 (1953).
221. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 92
58
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss1/7
19891 ECONOMIC LIBERTY
As to the qualifications needed to be a New Class reformer,
Edmund Burke explained the paradoxical truth in his belief that,
generally, those who are best able to find fault are the least qualified
to work toward reformation "because their minds are not only un-
furnished with patterns of the fair and good, but by habit they come
to take no delight in the contemplation of those things. By hating
vices [in the abstract] too much, they come to love men too little.' '222
In this regard, Irving Kristol noted that:
[Zealous environmentalists] are not really interested in clean air or clear water at
all. What does interest them is modern industrial society . . ., toward which they
have profoundly hostile sentiments . . . [They are at bottom rejecting a liberal
civijization which is given shape through the interaction of a countless sum of
individual preferences. Since they do not like the shape of that civilization, they
are moved to challenge-however indirectly or slyly-the process that produces
this shape. What [they] really want is very simple: ... the authority, the power
to create an 'environment' . . .[which] will be a society where the rulers will not
... 'think economically ....'
The 'consumer protection movement,' like the 'environmentalist' movement,
is a revulsion against the kind of civilization that common men create when they
are given the power, which a market economy ... uniquely give[s] them ....
[W]e can summarize our situation as follows: the Old Left accepted the idea
of the common good proposed by bourgeois-liberal society .... Bourgeois lib-
eralism insisted that individual liberty was a precondition of this common good;
[while] the Old Left insisted that centralized planning was a precondition but that
individual liberty would be an eventual consequence. The experience of post-World
War II decades has revealed that the Old Left simply could not compete with
bourgeois liberalism in this ideological debate. The result has been the emergence
of the New Left which implicitly rejects both the bourgeois-liberal and Old Left
idea of the common good, and which therefore [implicitly] rejects ... the ide-
ological presuppositions of modernity itself. This movement, which seeks to effd
222. E. BuRKE, Preserving and Reforming, 5 Works 302-9 (1789). As Frederic Bastinat noted:
Clearly then, the conscience of the social democrats cannot permit persons to have
any liberty because they believe that the nature of mankind tends always toward every kind
of degradation and disaster. Thus, . . . the legislators must make plans for the people in
order to save them from themselves.
[But] [i]f people are as incapable ... and as ignorant as the politicians indicate, then
why is the right of these same people to vote defended with such passionate insistence?
... If the natural tendencies of mankind are so bad that it is not safe to permit people
to be free, how is it that the tendencies of these [elite] are always so good? ... [D]o they
believe that they ... are made of a finer clay than the rest of mankind? .... [If] [they]
... have received from Heaven an intelligence and virtue that place them beyond and above
mankind .... let them show their title] to this superiority.
F. BAsTIAT, supra note 205, at 61-62.
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the sovereignty over our civilization of the common man, must begin by seeking
the death of 'economic man,' because it is in the marketplace [of a free society]
that this sovereignty is most firmly established. It thinks of itself as a 'progressive'
movement, whereas its import is regressive. This is one of the reasons why the
New Left . . .comes more and more to resemble the Old Right, which never did
accept the liberal-bourgeois [principles] . . ..
Professor Robert F. Nagel summed up the dynamics that have
aggravated the judiciary's self-perception as a part of the New Class
elite protecting freedom against a benighted, insensitive citizenry:
The single most significant event for present-day judges and scholars was the
federal judiciary's extended and often heroic assault on racial segregation in the
South. The profound formulative influence of this struggle has shaped as has
nothing else the law, role, and aspiration [of the judiciary], The operative image
has been the courts attacking a pernicious and deeply ingrained part of popular
culture. By degrees ... this image of the judiciary ... has consolidated and
grown, so that the courts' basic function has become [that of] critic and reformer
of the general culture ... [whose] role[] [is] to uplift an unappreciative and
uncomprehending mass sensibility... [and in so doing] persistently .. isolate[s]
itself from the general culture . ..
The antidote to the judiciary's inflated self-view is the realization
that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties .. . [to] as
great a degree as the courts."225 As noted earlier, Justice Frankfurter
aptly saw that by merely professing to act with human ends in mind,
the court does not save itself from being oligarchic because "[a]s
223. I. KRisTot, Two CHEERS FOR CAPrrALIsM 61-62 (1978). Professor James P. Beckwith has
noted that:
From the vantage point of a secure, sanitary, and prosperous society, the historical lessons
of the past 200 years are forgotten all too quickly. The idea of progress, being relative, is
not compared to a forgotten past. In lamenting the inequality of wealth, many ignore
universal, medieval misery. In a concern over long-term degenerative diseases allegedly caused
by the environmental impact of a mature market system, many forget that in pre-industrial
society few people lived long enough to develop such diseases. They further forget that in
our own time life expectancies continue to lengthen. In warning of the imminent exhaustion
of resources, many forget that technology is not static, that the market is flexible and
responsive to change, and that experience has disproved repeatedly these dire predictions
[H]istory ... overcome[s] ... the naive assumption that wealth is an everpresent fixed
quantity to be redistributed rather than an expandable ... presence ... limited only by
saving, capital investment, and human ingenuity.
Beckwith, supra note 21, at 3.
224. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. Rav. 165, 211-12 (1985).
225. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1048 (2nd Cir. 1983)
(citing FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 143, 146 (1940)).
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history amply proves, the judiciary is prone to misconceive the public
good by confounding private notions with constitutional require-
ments. But a democracy need not [and canot] rely on the courts to
save it from its own unwisdom. ' '2 6
In raw philosophical terms, C. S. Lewis summed up the gross
inadequacy of using vague amorphous concepts of public good as
the underlying philosophical or moral anchor or foundation for a
nation:
Many a popular 'planner' on a democratic platform, many a mild-eyed [social]
scientist in a democratic laboratory means, in the last resort, just what the Fascist
means. He believes that 'good' means whatever men are conditioned to approve.
He believes that it is the function of him and his kind to condition men, to create
consciences by ... psychological manipulation of infants, state education and
mass propaganda .... [Hie does not yet fully realize that those who create
conscience cannot be subject to it [as the creator is always superior to his or her
creation] .... If 'good' means only the local theology, how can those who invent
the local theology be guided by any idea of good themselves? The very idea of
good presupposes some objective moral law which overarches rulers and ruled
alike. Subjectivism about values is eternally incompatible with democracy ....
[since] [w]e and our rulers are of one kind only so long as we fare] subject to
one law [equally] ....
If we returned to the objective view [of morality] we should demand qualities
[in our leaders] much rarer, and much more beneficial virtue, knowledge and
skill. 'Vision' is for sale.., everywhere. But give me a man who will do a day's
work for a day's pay, who will refuse bribes, who will not make up his facts,
and who has learned his job.-
226. American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538, 555-56 (1949) (Frankfurter,
I., concurring).
227. C. S. LEwis, supra note 200. On the view that much of government, including the judiciary,
is infected with "gift-giving" bribery of one sort or another, see J. NooNAN, BRIBES (1984).
Some might say that unless government undertakes to be "compassionate," we will become a
nation of scoundrels and thieves. As noted by Frederic Bastiat:
This is an absurd conclusion, worthy only of those worshippers of government who believe
that the law is mankind.
... Does it follow that if the law is restricted .. ., we will be unable to use our facilities
[for good]? Suppose that the law does not force us to follow certain forms of religion,
... does it then follow that we shall eagerly plunge into atheism, hermitary, misery and
greed? .... Does it follow that we shall then cease to associate with each other, to help
each other, to love and succor our unfortunate brothers, ... and to strive to improve
ourselves to the best of our abilities?
BASTuT, supra note 205, at 72. Elsewhere, Bastiat noted that many of the intellectuals during the
two centuries preceding the French Revolution were immersed in:
[TJhe study of antiquity .... [which] present[ed] everywhere in Egypt, Persia, Greece,
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One ignores only at great peril the truth that, as Alexander Ham-
ilton stated, once "morality [is] overthrown (and morality must fall
with religion [or any belief in permanent truths]), the terrors of
despotism can alone curb . . man, and confine him with[in] the
bounds of social duty. ' 228 Simply put, if we as individuals live under
Rome the spectacle of a few men molding mankind .... But this ... proves only that
since men and society are capable of improvement [on their own], it is to be expected that
error, ignorance, despotism, slavery and superstition should be greatest towards the origins
of history .... not understanding[ing] that knowledge ... grows with the passage of time
Id. at 50-51. Those who object to Batistat's reasoning by arguing that any development or evolution
of human nature is so slow as to amount to nothing of consequence in over 6,000 years of recorded
history inadvertently testify that any "reformation" of humanity by Marxism or other utopian means
will last a very long time indeed.
228. Hamilton, The Spectacle of Revolutionary France, 6 Tim STAND (1978) (emphasis added).
Professor Peter L. Berger, Director of the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture at Boston
University recently summarized Marxism's quasi-religious nature and its attraction for the New Class:
Marxism can ... be understood as a ... secularized version of the classical biblical view
of history as consisting of a fall from grace, a set of redemptive events . . ., and ... a
great climax that will bring ordinary human history to an end. Marxism has substituted
private property and its "alienations" for original sin, the revolutionary process for ...
God's redemptive activity, the proletariat ... for the church, and the attainment of true
[world-wide] communism for the advent of the kingdom of God.
Both in the Third World and in the West, intellectuals have been prime candidates for this
'fideistic' commitment [to Marxism] .... How is one to account for that? ... [Iln most
countries intellectuals have become more estranged from ... religiously based morality than
any other ... group. Consequently, . . . intellectuals suffer from . . . 'alienation' ...
[and] are ... more susceptible to any secular messages of redemption from these ills. The
socialist myth, particularly in its Marxist version, is unusually well suited to meet these
needs .... Modern intellectuals are indeed 'children of the Enlightenment'-but not very
happy children at that. They do aspire to Enlightenment ideals-progress, reason, scientific
truth, humanistic values. But they also desire at least some of the traditional virtues that
modernity has undermined-collective solidarity, transcendence of individualism, and, last
[but] not least, moral certainty and ultimate meaning. Marxism has plausibly offered this
curious melange of modem and countermodern appeals from its inception.
P. BERGER, THE CAPrTALIST REVOLUTION: FIFrY PRoPosmIONs ABOUT PRosPERITY, EQUALITY AND LIB-
ERTY 197, 199 (1976). "Alienation" likely occurs not through any inherent process of "modernization"
but rather as a result of the inevitable tension between daily reality and the unreachable utopian goal
of Marxism with which our present mortal existence is inhumanely contrasted.
Without putting too fine a point on it, Professor Berger notes modern intellectual's impervi-
ousness to empirical evidence in this important instance:
What is remarkable ... is the ingenuity with which many have succeeded ... explaining
away the empirical discrepancies .... [So that] the location of the promised land was
simply shifted on the map of the world ... [from] the Soviet Union ... to [ ] China ...
then Cuba or Vietnam or Mozambique or Nicaragua ... ad infinitum. Nothing illustrates
the impermeability of myth to empirical disconfirmation as powerfully as the propensity of
62
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss1/7
ECONOMIC LIBERTY
a philosophy that permits unbridled self-gratification, doing as much
as one can get away with, the citizenry will inevitably cry out for
a "strong-arm" to forcibly impose social order.
Irving Kristol noted the fragile condition of the very philosoph-
ical or moral beliefs which make modern open society possible.229
Yet seemingly paradoxically, modern liberal society forcefully tends
to denigrate and eventually eradicate such beliefs, resulting in the
very impassioned conditions that give way to totalitarian systems.20
Kristol explained that a liberal society must necessarily be secular,
with religion mainly becoming a private affair. 2 1 As a result, there
is "a diminution of religious faith and a growing skepticism about
traditional consolations of religion .... ,,232This disestablishment
of religion inevitably leads to several significant consequences.2 3 One
such consequence is that individuals urgently and unreasonably de-
mand that their society provide them with temporal happiness.234
Another related consequence, is the inability of society to arrive at
a "convincing and generally accepted theory of political obliga-
tion. "235 In other words, mere civil loyalty is no longer sufficient
to convince an individual to die for his or her country.2 6 Kristol
declared:
For well over a hundred and fifty years ... , social critics have been warning
... that bourgeois society was living off the accumulated moral capital of tra-
ditional religion and ... moral philosophy, and that once this capital was de-
pleted, bourgeois society would find its legitimacy ever more questionable. These
critics were never, in their lifetime, . . . popular or persuasive. The educated
classes... simply could not bring themselves to believe that religion or philosophy
was that important to a polity. They could live with religion or morality as a
purely private affair, and they could not see why everyone else ... could not
do likewise .... [Yet] it is becoming clearer every day that even those who
intellectuals to locate 'true socialism' in one place after another.
Id. at 204.
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thought they were content with a religion that was a private affair are themselves
discovering that such a religion is existentially unsatisfactory.3'
Kristol's implication was clearly that our open society will in-
evitably disintegrate into one or another form of overt or covert
tyranny just as a variety of other nations have over the course of
recorded history unless society is able to discover a way to contin-
ually give individual private decisions true moral value on a daily
basis. The free market system-in which economic liberties thrive,
individual economic and moral choices are encouraged, and private
spheres of life are respected-is the only way of achieving and main-
taining an open society. The less the free market operates in an
open society, the greater the tendency for that society to destroy
the very common base of values that infuses it with life and the
nearer that society is to despotism (with or without a democratic
facade).238
After all, the free market alone provides a daily, direct, and
measurable competition among vying philosophies, values, and be-
liefs which are continually being weighed against one another on
the free market's scale. 29 Perhaps it is because the free market gives
237. Id. at 65-66.
238. Some people fear freedom and responsibility. So be it, because in a free society
mass man easily can live a life of unity and security in private collectives such as a monastery,
kibbutz, or utopian community, On the other hand, for the individual who cherishes au-
tonomy, to live as an individual within a socialist society is nearly impossible, Where is
[he or] she to go, and what is to insulate [him or] her from the reach of the state?
Beckwith, supra note 21, at 24. For a review of the extra-legal aspects of this issue, see L. von Misses,
LiBERALism IN THm CLAssIcAL TaRnmoxr (1935), SociALisM: AN FcoNoMIc AND SocIoLoocAL ANALYSIS
(1932); and OMNIPOTENT GOVERNMENT (1940).
239. Justice Holmes summed this up well in Abrams v. United States, 250 U,S, 616, 630 (1919)
(emphasis added):
[W]hen men ... realize] that [the test of] time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more ... that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas, that the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out.
Yet zealots or extremists at either end of the political and philosophical spectrum disparage reliance
on the free market of ideas, claiming instead that the situation is "too urgent" or that the masses
are blinded by a class or special interest group to see the nature of the "problem." The author is
reminded of a chance meeting with a rather erudite member of the Spartacus League, a group of
Marxist intellectuals. After hearing an analysis of "American capitalism," the author suggested that
if the group's position were as strong as its members believed, that serious efforts should be made
to amend the Constitution by eliminating private property and installing a socialist or collectivist
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each producer and consumer a vote with the evidence piling up in
its favor, that those who oppose the free market invariably attempt
instead to point to other issues arising in any economic system that
falls short of their lofty standard of unattainable collective perfec-
tion. While there is always room for improvement in any economic
system, judgment not tempered by a healthy dose of practical reality
is doomed to lead to disastrous consequences if it goes unchecked.
For those of us burdened with humanity's limited capacity for per-
fection, such demands by critics of the free market would lead to
an unmercifully inhumane demand for constant perfection under a
collectivist system. If indeed we have all fallen short of the glory
of God, what pretensions must a system make in presuming to raise
humanity to such heights?
Communism has gained adherents and nations over the past sev-
eral decades simply because it is as a "religion" which addresses
humanity's basic hunger for the divine:
[T]he Totalitarian State ... demands complete obedience and unlimited devotion
from its members who may have to undergo a period of probation before their
admission and who may be degraded in rank or expelled from the party altogether
if they show any signs of disloyalty or inefficiency. In short, it resembles a re-
ligious or military order ... and it tends to foster the same strong esprit de corps
they do.
[C]ommunism is not simply a form of political organization; it is... a philosophy
and a creed .... Communism. . . challenges Christianity on its own ground by
offering mankind a rival way of salvation. In the words of a Communist poster:
'Jesus promised the people paradise after death, but Lenin offers them Paradise
on earth.' Consequently the opposition of Communism to Christianity rests ..
on the religious exclusivism of the Communist philosophy . . .
240. Dawson, Religion and the Totalitarian State, The Criterion (Oct. 1934). See also Chickering,
Communism's Elusive Holy Grail, wall St. J. May 16, 1986, at 24 (noting "Marxism's appeal to
religious longing"). The French philosopher Jean-Francois Revel noted this in Without Marx or Jesus
(1971). Then-Chief Justice Warren Burger concluded that Americans have turned "to the courts for
relief from a range of personal distresses and anxieties ... to fill the void created by the decline
of church, family and neighborhood unity." Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274,
275 (1982). See also HOLLANDER, supra note 20, at 157 ("socialists ... are in fact God-seekers,
looking for the kingdom of God on earth .... If you don't believe in heaven, you believe in so-
cialism."); Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male
Reaction, 86 Mic. L. Rav. 465, 507 n.135 (1987) (urging "a minimal utopia of social life char-
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Communism does indeed require an intense religious-like belief
of its adherents. According to Marx and Lenin, no single nation
can progress higher than being merely socialist until all nations first
become socialist. Once all nations become socialist, communism will
only then come into being. At that point in human history, many
wonderful things supposedly will occur by an-as-yet-unexplained
process: the need for national boundaries will end and we will be-
come one family under one world government. Human misery, greed,
lust, and hatred will somehow cease. In short, heaven will come to
exist upon earth.241
241. Discussing communism and the Communist Manifesto, the Encyclopedia Americana puts
it this way:
In their later writings, Marx and Engles described the ideal communist society ... as
a system of social ownership under which ... the state would cease to be an instrument
of force [law] and "wither away" [somehow] and the individual would live in freedom and
harmony with society.
[It would be] a new epoch in human history, as a socioeconomic order with [an]
unrestricted abundance of productivity but no private ownership of the means of production,
an order without classes, class struggle, exploitation and oppression.
7 ENCYCLOPEDu AmERiCANA ComuNIsm 436, 439 (1989). See also L. VoN MIsEs, SocALIS 82 (1951)
("As soon as there is no longer any ... class ... struggle .... then there will be nothing to repress
and nothing to make necessary a ... repressive power, [the] state .... The intervention of state
power [then] ... at last ... falls asleep of its own accord.") (quoting ENGLES, HERM' EUGEN DUHR-
INGS UMWALZUNG DER WISSENSCHAFr 302 (1910)).
However, a steady stream of renewed scholarly thought concludes that Marxism or any "planned"
economy is unworkable since no one person or group of dedicated "planners" can ever know enough
to adequately plan for the rest of us as an ever-increasing knowledge base raises ever-new questions
and commensurate ever-new areas of ignorance:
Implicit in Karl Marx's critique of capitalism was the original conception of ...
"comprehensive planning" ... [which involved a] presuppos[ition] that it is actually pos-
sible to ... control the causal development of a modern ... advanced economy.
Yet without such [all-encompassing] knowledge [justifying substituting the multitude of forces
that make up the free market for a centralized bureaucracy,] the [government] planning
bureau would be unable to justify intervening in ignorance into the workings of the market.
[T]he advocates of ... planning never tire of reminding us what a tremendously ar-
duous task planning a modem economy is, by [so that] in doing so they are not responding
to the central contention of the knowledge problem argument, which concludes that the
way a modem economy works necessarily precludes its being rationally controlled .... In
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Please pause here for a moment to consider the truly astounding
leap of faith required by the communist creed. In view of humanity's
6,000 years of proof that it is incapable of learning from history,
acceptance of a collectivist "salvation" requires a leap of faith that,
short, our economic malaise cannot be blamed on the fact that our economy is out of
control [in the sense that it can be "planned"] because no modern economy could possibly
be otherwise.
D. LAvoiE, NATIONAL EcoNoMIc PLANNING: WHAT Is LEFr? 3-4, 6, 8-9 (1985). In this respect, Professor
Lavoie added that:
[A] [g]rowing knowledge [base] does not constitute an ever-widening grasp of reality. But
there is a sense in which we cannot say [that] our ignorance is being reduced, for the more
we know, the more new questions we are able to ask.
The conclusion ... that the social aspirations of advocates of comprehensive planning would
more than exhaust the intellectual capacity of human minds.., has a [further] troublesome
obstacle to overcome .... the existence of a[] ... general and insurmountable limit to
the powers of the mind .... It is exceedingly difficult for our intelligence to [routinely]
grapple with its own shortcomings, since to describe them in detail would require the spelling
out of [that] wh[ich] we do not know ....
Id. at 58, 65. See also Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 357
(1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("People do not have words to fit ideas that have never occurred
to them.").
Another reason suggested by Professor Lavoie as to why Marxism is unworkable is the little-
noticed conflict between its true origins and proclaimed aim of universal peace and brotherhood:
Contrary to the usual story, the notion of planning was not born in the mind of...
Karl Marx, but rather in the mind of an elitist admirer of the military order, military
discipline, and rule by an intelligensia made up of engineers, industrialists, and bankers.
Planning was born as a mutual protection for a corporate elite.
[As] argued forcefully by the American liberal Walter Lippman[,] ... [planning] is essen-
tially a militarization of the economy, the most complete forms [to date] of which have
been National Socialist and Stalinist communism.
Stalin was able to perfect the war economy, from which other nations that had dem-
ocratic traditions had to retreat in peacetime by declaring a permanent civil war within his
own country's borders ....
When the story of the Left is seen in this light, the idea of economic planning ...
appear[s] ... [to be] reactionary. The theory of planning was, from its inception, modeled
after feudal and militaristic organizations.
LAOVIE, supra, at 218, 220, 222, 230.
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makes the beliefs of the most radical religious fundamentalist ab-
solutely pale in comparison. To ignore communism's leap of faith
is to ignore what should be its most obvious and fundamental tenent,
for without the arrival of the elusive future golden age, its hardship
will be tragic and wasteful on a global scale. Ignoring the fact that
many theologians have shown that traditional Judeo-Christian teach-
ings enables all to share a truly abundant life here and now, the
prospect of a next life seems infinitely more likely to come to pass
than paradise in this one.
The lack of a deity does not preclude a deeply-held belief such
as communism from being a "religion" if it serves as the ultimate
concern in one's life. 242 As the Supreme Court said, "[a]mong reli-
gions in this country which do not teach what would generally be
considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism,
Ethical Culture [and] Secular Humanism .... "24 Thus, some ap-
parently worship a utopian future golden age, with an activist judicial
priesthood wittingly or not serving as a handmaiden or midwife.
244
Ideas certainly have consequences. Ideas about economic liberties
have consequences which affect individuals' lives through the broad-
ening and lessening of personal freedoms. If our nation should decide
to embrace a system other than the free market, it should at least
242. The Supreme Court said as much in the context of a military draftee's conscientious objector
claim in Welch v. United States, ("If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely
ethical or moral in source and content but that ... occupy in the life of that individual 'a place
parallel to that filled by God' .. . his beliefs function as a religion in his life .... "). Welch v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)).
243. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961). Those in professions other than law
have noted that principle also:
Humanity, [John] Dewey recognized, was innately religious .... [So] [h]e urged ... Amer-
icans to adopt 'a common faith,' a public philosophy based on a morality that valued ...
the furtherance of mutual aid ard affection .... Indeed, Dewey was more frank than
most secularists in admitting the religious nature of his secular scheme. He correctly saw
that secularization involved the replacement of one religion with another.
Marsden, Are Secularists the Threat? Is Religion the Solution?, UNSECULAR AMERICA 31, 38 (1986).
For a good overview, see Gangi, The Supreme Court: An Intentionist's Critique of Non-Interpretive
Review, 28 CATHOLIC LAWYER 253, 258-60 (1983) (summarizing how western society's belief in an
orderly universe created by an orderly Deity made possible the rise of modern science and learning).
244. See Kornhauser, supra note 240, at 172 ("Judges have long employed religious terms when
speaking of the Constitution") (citing H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL Fzar (1968); Lerner, Constitution
and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1294-95 (1937); Levinson, The Constitution in American
Civil Religions, 1979 Sup. CT. Rv. 123).
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do so with a clear vision of the practical consequences and the like-
lihood (or lack thereof) of reaching the purported collectivist goal of
heaven-on-earth. Like democracy, a free market system is the worst
system, except for all the others.
In sum, the current philosophical and legal malaise affecting ec-
onomic liberty seems to stem from the following five popularly ac-
cepted concepts which are nonetheless erroneous: 245
1. The first is a failure to acknowledge or to recognize the in-
evitable chill on the exercise of personal freedoms as a result
of excessive governmental regulation and control of economic
liberties. After all, he or she who controls the purse-strings
reigns supreme.
245. Given the quasi-religious nature of beliefs about the issues cited here, the author readily
acknowledges the resistance and outright hostility that these statements may engender and the limited
potential for rational discourse with collectivist "true believers". As Professor Lavoie noted,
[T]he kinds of attitudes toward market institutions that the advocacy of comprehensive
planning [has] instilled in its followers [have] made it psychologically if not logically im-
possible for them to endorse the radical ideal sketched here ... [and] turn immediately
from vehemently condemning the market (for its inability to attain what turns out to be
an impossible standard) to [at least silently] warmly embracing it ....
Unfortunately, it can still be said today that all revolutions have only served to transfer
rule from one hand to another ... [and has shown] 'very convincingly that ... state
ownership of the means of production . . . is not only compatible with all [the] disasters
of the capitalist world ... but that it adds to them a series of disasters of its own: in-
efficiency, lack of economic incentives and, above all, the unrestricted role of the omnipotent
bureaucracy, a concentration of power never before known in human history.'
Common law principles accompanied the evolution of free markets in Britain, and
some form of property rights prevailed in every nation that participated in the rapid ec-
onomic growth known as the industrial revolution [in which most of the Third World longs
to join].
[T]he birth of free-market notion in classical liberalism represents a powerful movement in
direct-if not always consistent-opposition to the status quo .... The citadels of power
are ... , whether they know it or not, more threatened by the spontaneous forces of the
openly competitive market than by any other factor .... Ideologies that seek increased
governmental intervention into the economy have been only helping the powerful secure
better control ....
LoAvm, supra note 241, at 232, 238, 240-42 (quoting SPOONER, VICES ARE NOT CRIMES (1875)).
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2. The second is a perception that government-mandated redis-
tribution of wealth is laudable in furthering public morality.
Forgotten is the injustice done to the honest citizen whose wealth
is taken against his or her will. Also forgotten is the truth that
individual initiative is the sine qua non of any morally good
action or decision. Such efforts at legislating morality are no
less abhorrent when done by the political right or left. Zealous
but misguided individuals' refusal to heed this truth will pro-
duce results reminiscent of, yet far bloodier than, the worst
excesses of the Temperance movement.
3. The third is a belief that extensive governmental regulation of
the economy somehow ultimately benefits the "little guy."
4. The fourth is a failure to see that any system which inexorably
restricts individual initiative inevitably reverts from a system
of "contract" to one of "status."
5. The fifth is a religious utopian thesis that, given enough public
largess, human nature will develop into a qualitatively new en-
tity. This thesis is fundamental to Marxism which posits that
humanity will ultimately reach a perfect state of existence only
after all nations become socialist. However, given humanity's
inability to change in 6,000 years of recorded history and given
the permanence and excesses of totalitarian regimes in both
ancient and modern times, the optimism implicit in Marxism
requires an insurmountable leap of faith which makes the be-
liefs of the most radical religious fundamentalists pale in com-
parison.247
246. As stated by Tom Bethell in The Riches of the Orient:
Once the presumption is established [under any system that creates an elite group of
'planners'] that some citizens are inferior to others, or are somehow disadvantaged, then
contracts ... will cease to be the dominant mode of transaction ... [and] will be replaced
by command and coercion ....
The characteristic activities of the modem ... state can ... be defined as the struggle
to expand the number of groups whose 'underprivileged' status entitles them to privileged
treatment... unconsciously seek[ing] to reverse what the English legal historian Sir Henry
Maine called ... the 'movement of progressive societies ... from status to contract.'
T. BEr1A, The Riches of the Orient, NATONAL Rvmw, Nov. 7, 1986 at 38-39.
247. As to arguments that Marxism is an "historical inevitability", Professor Lavoie offers these
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Restoring the relation between economic liberty and personal free-
doms, which are part of a single Bill of Rights, to a balanced equi-
librium would go far to again recognize the importance and
interdependence of both. Since, as in other areas of life, economic
and personal freedoms are integral parts of a single constitutional
whole, grossly different judicial treatment of them is simply not jus-
tified or supported by logic or by historical record. The judiciary
certainly has the expertise to review economic legislation vigorously,
given the judiciary's readiness to issue institutional relief against state
and local governments, a practice which directly requires massive on-
going public expenditures and a plunge into a multitude of political
and economic thickets.
Returning to the framers' intent on any matter, including eco-
nomic rights, is not judicial activism. To the contrary, judicial ac-
tivism constitutes a departure from allegedly outmoded principles in
the name of a supposedly higher good, but which inevitably amounts
to little more than imposition of one's own personal or class views
or biases. Judicial activism may well be motivated by a wish to engage
in social-engineering while leaving behind the mundane limits of ju-
dicial restraint and historical research necessary to justify constitu-
tional case-law.
sobering thoughts:
The thesis that planning is bound to come is usually joined to . . . Heilbronner['s]
[claim] that 'it is futile to think of social evolution as permitting a return to the 'simpler'
ways of the past.' 'History,' he proclaims, 'is a cumulative process that permits no such
retreats.'
[I]t is not clear how Heilbronner [or any advocate of that theory] has gained access
to . . . what history will or will not permit [given humanity's free will] . . . . However, the
evident failure of Marxists or any other social scientists to predict the future development
of capitalism should have taught us by now that nobody can claim any special access to
the laws of history .... If human beings wanted to return to an older [and sounder] mode
of social cooperation, and if no socioeconomic reasons were given as to why this cannot
work, then there is no reason to doubt that history will 'permit' such a development.
Heilbronner's position [as to Marxism's 'inevitability'] ... suggest[s] that, if human folly
ever takes social evolution down the wrong path, we are for some unexplained reason
doomed never to backtrack and correct the errors.
LoAviB, supra, note 241, at 143-44.
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If the original meaning of the Constitution has been irretrievably
lost, with regard to personal freedoms or economic liberties, the desire
to restate and reaffirm such basic understandings and guarantees by
convening a new constitutional convention should be overwhelming.
In the absence of a strong move in that direction, one can only suspect
that a new constitutional convention is seen by some as an obstruction
to continued imposition of personal or class values under the guise
of effecting social progress though constitutional adjudication. As
worthy a goal as effecting sound progress may be, "[i]t is not ad-
missible to do a great right by doing a little wrong."' ' 8
Even if sincerely held, the belief that constitutional adjudication
might properly proceed on the basis of current mores raises a pro-
foundly disquieting element into the supposed permanency of con-
stitutional guarantees-and is indeed treacherous shifting-sand upon
which to build constitutional jurisprudence of the future. If current
disregard of the need and basis for a consistently principled approach
to constitutional adjudication continues, the inevitable social and legal
disintegration that follows will result in imposition of a new ortho-
doxy that will almost certainly be much less free. As noted earlier,
a Republican form of government is still quite young in relation to
the millennia of despotism that comprises nearly all of recorded his-
tory. No one knows whether democracy will be permanently estab-
lished or simply will dissolve under its own weight into a footnote
of world history which has been comprised of almost constant tyranny
of one sort or another. Like God at the Creation, we should so value
freedom and liberty that we are willing to tolerate the sin or abuse
resulting from allowing free moral agents to exercise that liberty.
The essence of much said here is summed up by a simple statement
which appears in the North Carolina Constitution: "A frequent re-
currence to fundamental principal is absolutely necessary to preserve
the blessings of liberty.'' 24 Justice Louis D. Brandies put it well in
Whitney v. California:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties .... They valued liberty both as an end
248. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447 (1966).
249. N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 35.
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and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage
to be the secret of liberty.
In parting, the author wishes to state that his purpose has not
been to advocate any one partisan view over another. Like the late
Professor Alexander M. Bickel, he is libertarian or "conservative in
the classic sense, believing that justice in any society depends on re-
spect for the rules; respect by citizens, presidents, secretaries of state,
and judges."' 251
It is, obviously, of prime importance to recall that each freedom
imposes a corresponding responsibility and that when any freedom
is long exercised without concern for its corresponding responsibility,
it will be reduced or destroyed one way or another. Without a self-
governing, restrained people, loss of liberty results. In parting, per-
haps the source of Judeo-Christian wisdom and compassion 25 2 says
it best:
For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this; thou shalt love thy neighbor
as thyself.
250. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). The thought that maintaining, let alone improving, a republic
and constitution requires considerable bravery and stamina rings throughout statements by the Supreme
Court. See Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1, 7 (1911) (Holmes, J., for the Court) ("[Cionstitutional law
like other great mortal contrivances has to take some chances . . . ."); Adler v. Board of Education,
342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("We need be bold and adventuresome in our
thinking to survive."). Of course, "boldness and bravery" do not authorize departing from the limits
of our written constitution. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636 (1943) ("Government
of limited power need not be anemic government"). Fear of returning to basic principles of personal
and economic constitutional guarantees bodes ill for the health of our legal system. Loubriel v. United
States, 9 F.2d 807, 808 (2nd Cir. 1926) (Learned Hand, J.) ("[T]here is no surer sign of a feeble
and fumbling law than timidity in penetrating the form to [get to] the substance."); Solzhenitsyn at
Harvard 5-6 (Ethics and Public Policy Center 1980) ("A decline in courage may be the most striking
feature ... in the West today .... Such a decline is particularly noticeable among the ruling and
intellectual elites .... Must one point out that from ancient time a decline in courage has been
considered the first symptom of the end?").
251. A. BICKEL, THE Stu' EznE COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESs (1978) (introduction by A.
Lewis).
252. See NAsa, POVERTY AND XVEAm: THE CamusmTaN DEBAaE OVER C.prrAnisM 199 (1986)
("A capitalism that is cut loose from traditional values is a capitalism that is headed for trouble. A
capitalism grounded on ... Judeo-Christian values versus a capitalism grounded on hedonism, the
love of money and materialism are head[ed] in two different directions"); HoUERwaS, ColrtmNrT
OF CHARACTER 79 (1981) (quoting John Adams) ("Our Constitution was made only for a moral and
religious people. It is wholly inadequate for the government of any other.").
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But if you bite and devour one another, take heed that you be not consumed
one of another. 3
253. Galatians 5:14-15. This principle has been fully recognized by secular authority as well. See
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 547-48 (1837):
[The object and end of all government is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the
community by which it is established .... [W]hile the rights of private property are sacredly
guarded, we must not forget that the community also has rights, and that the happiness
and well being of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation.
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